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Enacted in 1924, the Federal Arbitration Act' established a "federal
policy favoring arbitration ' 2 by providing that agreements to arbitrate are
valid, irrevocable, and enforceable or unenforceable on the same grounds
as any contract. 3 Despite this federal policy, the securities industry for many
years has encountered resistance from the courts. Only recently, the Secu-
rities and Exchange Commission ("SEC' ")4 and the Supreme Court have
expressed confidence in the fairness of arbitration proceedings,5 to a great
extent because of the SEC's relatively new, increased oversight authority
and congested judicial dockets.
6
Notwithstanding this resistance, the securities industry, which considers
arbitration as a quick, inexpensive, and fair means of dispute resolution,
has made extensive use of arbitration pursuant to securities exchanges'
constitutions, by-laws, and rules mandating arbitration of intra-industry
disputes and those arising between a firm and its registered personnel. 7
Arbitration agreements also have been included in many broker-customer
agreements. 8 The Supreme Court's 1987 decision in Shearson/American
1. The Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-15 (1970).
2. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983).
3. See The Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1970).
4. See Brief for the Securities and Exchange Commission as Amicus Curiae at 13-21,
Shearson/American Express Co. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
5. Although a federal policy favoring arbitration was 'established in the 1920s, courts
(including the Supreme Court) for many years thereafter remained distrustful of the arbitration
process and often cited "congressional intent" in support of decisions to override this policy.
See Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
6. See Brief for the Securities and Exchange Commission as Amicus Curiae at 16,
Shearson/American Express Co. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220.
7. Letter from members of the security industry to Rep. Edward Markey (D-Mass.)
(Aug. 8, 1988) (available from Wash. & Lee L. Rev.).
8. In October 1987, the SEC's Division of Market Regulation undertook an examination
by written questionnaire of 65 broker-dealers "to learn their current policies and practices
with respect to the use of predispute arbitration clauses for retail customers." Summary of
Staff Findings With Respect To The Use of Predispute Arbitration Cases, Division of Market
Regulation, Securities and Exchange Commission, at 1 (June 2, 1988) (available from Wash.
& Lee L. Rev.). The 65 broker-dealer firms, which account for approximately ninety percent
of all customer trading accounts in the United States, included 25 of the largest New York
Stock Exchange ("NYSE") member firms, the 20 largest member firms of the National
Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. ("NASD"), which are not members of the NYSE, and
a cross-section of other NASD firms. Id. On June 2, 1988, the SEC's staff reported its
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Express Co. v. McMahon9 and the very recent decision in Rodriguez de
Quijas v. Shearson/American Express Co.'0 now firmly establish arbitration
as the primary dispute resolution forum for securities broker-customer
disputes and should lead to the expanded use of arbitration agreements by
most of the financial services industry."
This article examines the many new judicial, regulatory, and legislative
developments which have occurred in the area of arbitration and the many
unsettled issues which will give rise to future litigation.
PART I
JUDICIAL PRECEDENTS
A court entertaining a motion to stay a judicial proceeding and compel
arbitration under the Arbitration Act must perform four tasks:
[F]irst, it must determine whether the parties agreed to arbitrate;
[S]econd, it must determine the scope of [the] agreement;
[T]hird, if federal statutory claims are asserted, it must consider
whether Congress intended those claims to be nonarbitrable; [and]
[F]ourth, if the court concludes that some, but not all of the claims
in the above action are subject to arbitration, it must determine
whether to stay the remainder of the [judicial] proceedings pending
arbitration. 2
Recent judicial decisions illustrate the analysis and conclusions of courts
deciding these issues.
findings. With respect to margin and option accounts, virtually all of the firms surveyed
required their customers to execute predispute arbitration agreements. Id. at 3. Approximately
39% of the firms surveyed required predispute clauses for cash accounts. Id. at 5.
The use of arbitration as a forum for dispute resolution is also pervasive in other
business arenas. Arbitration has been used widely as an alternate forum for the resolution of
disputes arising in the construction business and in controversies arising under international
trade agreements. Recently, arbitration clauses have begun to appear in the agreements
governing various types of banking transactions including some loan agreements. This move
on the part of the banking industry is a major departure from past practices because the
banking community, to a great degree, had reservations about arbitration panels and preferred
to rely upon the courts to enforce detailed agreements. The prior non-use of arbitration by
the banking industry also can be traced to an additional cause: bankers did not have a strong
incentive to reduce litigation costs because their agreements provided that the lender was
responsible for the payment of all costs incurred in the enforcement of the agreement and in
collection of sums due thereunder. See Butler, Arbitration in California Banking, 19 REv.
FiN. SERv. REo. 189 (Nov. 2, 1988).
9. 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
10. 109 S. Ct. 1917 (1989). Justice Kennedy delivered the Court's 5-4 decision in which
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, O'Connor, and Scalia joined. Justice Stevens,
joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun, dissented.
11. See Butler, supra note 8, at 189-94 (discussing expanded use of arbitration by
financial institutions).
12. Creative Securities Corp. v. Bear Stearns & Co., 671 F. Supp. 961, 965 (S.D.N.Y.
1987).
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A. What Claims Are Arbitrable?
1. The McMahon Decision
Prior to the United States Supreme Court's decision in McMahon, the
enforceability of predispute agreements between firms and their customers
was uncertain at best. In fact, judicial distrust of arbitration proceedings
and the reluctance of courts to enforce arbitration agreements despite the
strong federal policy favoring arbitration was reflected in decisions such as
Wilko v. Swan.
13
In 1953, the Supreme Court in Wilko held that predispute agreements
to arbitrate claims arising under section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933
('33 Act") were unenforceable.1 4 While acknowledging the strong federal
policy favoring arbitration of disputes, the Supreme Court, nonetheless,
declared arbitration proceedings to be an inappropriate forum for the
resolution of disputes arising under the '33 Act and expressed fear that the
"effectiveness in [the] application [of the provisions of the '33 Act] is
lessened in arbitration as compared to judicial proceedings.''
5
To support this conclusion, the Court found that the 1933 Act "was
drafted with an eye to the disadvantages under which buyers labor"'1 6 and
that section 14 of the '33 Act reflected the congressional intent "to put
buyers of securities covered by [the] Act on a different basis from other
purchasers.' ' 7 In light of this assessment, the Court concluded that because
section 12(2) allows an investor to select a judicial forum in which to assert
his claim, and section 14 precludes a waiver of this provision, a predispute
agreement to arbitrate section 12(2) claims is unenforceable.' 8
Because section 29(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("Exchange
Act" or '34 Act") is virtually identical to section 14 of the '33 Act, the
lower federal courts quickly extended the reasoning in Wilko to predispute
agreements to arbitrate claims arising under section 10(b) of the Exchange
Act and SEC Rule lOb-5.' 9 This thirty-year pattern was disrupted when the
Supreme Court in McMahon refused, in a five-four split decision, to extend
the holding of Wilko to predispute agreements to arbitrate claims under the
Exchange Act. 20 The Court, however, declined to expressly overrule the
holding of Wilko. 2' As a result of McMahon, claims based on alleged
violations of the Exchange Act and RICO were subject thereafter to arbi-
tration.22
13. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
14. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 438 (1953).
15. Id. at 435.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 438.
19. Shearson/American Express Co. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 225 n.1 (1987).
20. Id. at 238.
21. Id. at 234.
22. Id. at 238, 242.
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Rejecting arguments that predispute agreements to arbitrate constitute
a waiver of federal securities law provisions in derision of congressional
intent, the McMahon court offered an explanation for the reasoning behind
the Wilko Court's ruling:
... the reasons given in Wilko reflect a general suspicion of the
desirability of arbitration and the competence of arbitral tribunals-
most apply with no greater force to the arbitration of securities
disputes than to the arbitration of legal disputes generally. It is
difficult to reconcile Wilko's mistrust of the arbitral process with
this Court's subsequent decisions involving the Arbitration Act....
Indeed, most of the reasons given in Wilko have been rejected
subsequently by the Court as a basis for holding claims to be
nonarbitrable.Y
2. The Rodriguez Decision
In the wake of MeMahon, a split occurred among the lower federal
courts with respect to the arbitrability of claims arising under the '33 Act. 24
With the McMahon Court specifically declining to overrule the Wilko
decision, a number of courts continued to recognize Wilko as controlling
and, therefore, held that '33 Act claims were not arbitrable. 25 However, an
23. Id. at 231.
24. Decisions holding that '33 Act claims are not arbitrable include: Chang v. Lin, 824
F.2d 219, 222 (2d Cir. 1987); Ketchum v. Prudential-Bache Securities, Inc., 685 F. Supp. 786,
792 (D. Kan. 1989); Araim v. Paine Webber, Inc., 691 F. Supp. 1416, 1418 (N.D. Ga. 1988);
Pompano-Windy City Partners Ltd. v. Bear Stearns & Co., 1988 W.L. 122014 (S.D.N.Y.
1988); McCowan v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 682 F. Sup. 741, 744 (S.D.N.Y. 1987);
Schultz v. Robinson-Humphrey/American Express Co., 666 F. Supp. 219, 220 (M.D. Ga.
1987); Continental Serv. Life and Health Ins. Co. v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, 664 F. Supp.
997, 1001 (M.D. La. 1987); Goldberg v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., No. 83-C-8586 (N.D.
Ill. Dec. 16, 1987); Helfricht v. Jeffries & Co., No. 85-0466 (D.N.J. Oct. 14, 1987); Johnson
v. O'Brien, 420 N.W.2d 264, 267 (Minn. App. 1988). In Osterneck v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 841 F.2d 508, 512 (3d Cir. 1988), the court, in dicta, appeared to
affirm this result, stating that "[als long as Wilko stands in the Supreme Court, agreements
to arbitrate claims under the Securities Act of 1933 will remain unenforceable, but that is the
only rule Wilko now stands for."
Decisions holding that '33 Act claims are arbitrable include: Reed v. Bear Stearns &
Co., 698 F. Supp. 835 (D. Kan. 1988); Ryan v. Liss, Tenner & Goldberg Securities Corp.,
683 F. Supp. 480 (D.N.J. 1988); Kavouras v. Visual Products Systems, Inc., 680 F. Supp. 205
(W.D. Pa. 1988); Aronson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 675 F. Supp. 1324 (S.D. Fla. 1987);
De Kuyper v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, 695 F. Supp. 1367 (D. Conn. 1987); Rosenblum v.
Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., 700 F. Supp. 874 (E.D. La. 1987); Staiman v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 673 F. Supp. 1009 (C.D. Cal. 1987).
25. See cases cited supra note 24. As a result of McMahon, the court in Schultz v.
Robinson-Humphrey/American Express Co., 666 F. Supp. 219, 220, (M.D. Ga. 1987), ob-
served:
One, the Supreme Court specifically chose not to overrule the Wilko decision.
While announcing that Wilko stands only for the proposition that a waiver of
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increasing number of lower courts found that the McMahon court totally
undermined the Wilko rationale and, in so doing, its raison d'etre.26 Indeed,
the Fifth Circuit noted that "McMahon undercuts every aspect of Wilko v.
Swan ... a formal overruling of Wilko appears inevitable-or, perhaps,
superfluous." 27
The split in the lower federal courts was resolved in May 1989 in
Rodriguez. Petitioners again were Shearson customers who had signed
standard customer agreements providing for the arbitration of any contro-
versy arising out of or relating to their customer accounts except where
such agreement to do so is unenforceable under federal or state law.
2
1
Alleging unauthorized, fraudulent transactions in securities, the plaintiffs
asserted claims under the '33 Act and the '34 Act.29 The district court,
following Wilko, ordered all of the claims, except those asserted under the
'33 Act, to arbitration.30 On appeal, the Fifth Circuit reversed the district
court, finding that post-Wilko Supreme Court decisions had rendered Wilko
obsolete.' On certiorari, petitioners asked the United States Supreme Court
judicial forum is barred when arbitration is inadequate to protect the substantive
rights at issue, it did not state that its conclusion in Wilko would now be different
given its finding in McMahon that arbitration procedures are now reliable....
Second, the legislative history cited in McMahon appears to strongly suggest
that, unlike for The Exchange Act, a ratification by Congress of the Wilko decision
as it relates to the nonarbitrable nature of Section 12 claims has been made. Thus,
Congress' intent to make Section 12 claims nonarbitrable is clearer than it was for
claims arising under The Exchange Act.
Finally, the distinctions between a Section 12(2) action and a 10(b) action may
militate against an extension of the McMahon decision to a Section 12(2) claim....
26. See cases cited supra note 24. The Court in Staiman v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner
& Smith, Inc., 673 F. Supp. 1009, 1011 (C.D. Cal. 1987), summarized this viewpoint:
First, the anti-waiver provision in the 1933 Act are [sic] nearly identical to the
anti-waiver provision in the 1934 Act.... Now that the McMahon Court has held
that parties agreeing to arbitration do not waive a substantive provision of the 1934
Act when they forego the right to a judicial forum, . . . the nearly identical anti-
waiver provision in the 1933 Act should be similarly construed.
Second, the McMahon Court severely restricted the holding of Wilko as barring
waiver of a judicial forum only where arbitration is inadequate to protect the
substantive rights at issue .... [Plaintiff] has made no showing whatsoever that his
1933 Act claims, . . . would be inadequately protected in arbitration. This court
reads McMahon as requiring such a showing.
Third, the McMahon Court noted the expanded oversight authority exercised
by the Securities and Exchange Commission over the national securities exchanges
and held that it can no longer be assumed that a complainant's rights could not be
vindicated through arbitration .... McMahon held that an arbitration held pursuant
to the identical NYSE procedures did not effect a waiver of the 1934 Act. A similar
conclusion is compelled for claims under the 1933 Act.
'27. Noble v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., 823 F.2d 849, 850 n.3 (5th Cir. 1987).
28. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express Co., 109 S. Ct. 1917, 1918
(1989).
29. Id.
30. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Lehman Brothers Inc., 845 F.2d 1296, 1297 (5th
Cir. 1988).
31. Id. at 1299.
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to determine the arbitrability of claims asserted under section 12(2) of the
'33 Act and, further, if such claims were found to be arbitrable, to determine
if a reversal of Wilko should be given retroactive effect.
32
While severely criticizing the Fifth Circuit and other courts for renounc-
ing Wilko prematurely on their own authority," the Supreme Court over-
ruled Wilko in another five-four decision.3 4 According to the Rodriguez
Court, "Wilko was incorrectly decided and is inconsistent with prevailing
uniform construction of other federal statutes governing arbitration agree-
ments in the setting of business transactions. ' 35 The Court described Wilko
as having "fallen far out of step with our current strong endorsement of
the federal statutes favoring this method of resolving disputes."
'36
Explaining the reversal, the Supreme Court found that section 14 of
the '33 Act does not "prohibit agreements to arbitrate future disputes of
securities ' 37 and that the Wilko Court's earlier finding in this connection
"rested on suspicion of arbitration as a method of weakening the protections
afforded in the substantive law to would-be-complainants.
'38
The inconsistency that would result if the "decisions in Wilko and
McMahon continue[d] to exist side by side' 39 also influenced the Court's
decision. In light of the precepts of McMahon, the Rodriguez Court
declared:
Their inconsistency is at odds with the principle that the 1933 and
1934 Acts should be construed harmoniously because they 'constitute
interrelated components of the federal regulatory scheme governing
transactions in securities.' . . . In addition, the inconsistency be-
tween Wilko and McMahon undermines the essential rationale for
a harmonious construction of the two statutes, which is to discour-
age litigants from manipulating their allegations merely to cast their
claims under one of the securities laws rather than another. 40
3. Retroactive Application of McMahon and Rodriguez
The McMahon decision was silent on whether the ruling should have
retroactive application. As a result, the lower federal courts were left to
grapple with that issue.
41
32. Rodriguez, 109 S. Ct. at 1918.
33. Id. at 1921.
34. Id. at 1922.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 1920.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 1922.
40. Id.
41. Decisions applying the holding of McMahon retroactively include: Peterson v. Shear-
son/American Express Co., 849 F.2d 464 (10th Cir. 1988); Cohen v. Wedbush Noble Cooke,
Inc., 841 F.2d 282 (9th Cir. 1988); Fox v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 826 F.2d 1059 (4th
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Some courts refused to apply McMahon to claims that were filed before
that decision on the basis of the waiver doctrine. The Fifth Circuit's opinion
in Noble v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc. ,4 however, is illustrative of the
approach taken by courts granting retroactive application of McMahon.
The Noble case arose in the context of an appeal of an order staying
litigation of the plaintiff's Exchange Act claims pending arbitration of the
state law claims (all claims were based on the same conduct). On its own
motion, the court applied the McMahon holding retroactively, 43 observing
that although "[tihe usual rule is that federal cases should be decided in
accordance with the law existing at the time of the decision," 44 case-by-case
exceptions are made "when a change in the law is unfairly disruptive of a
litigant's course of conduct or reasonable expectations. '45 In determining
whether the retroactive application would create undue prejudice, the Noble
court applied the three-prong test set forth in Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson:
46
(1) McMahon did not establish an entirely new principle of law; (2) federal
policy favors retroactive application; and (3) retroactive application does
not alter the plaintiff's substantive rights, and the plaintiff would not have
refused to sign the customer agreement if he had known Exchange Act
claims would have been subject to arbitration.47 The court further noted
that because the case had not yet gone to trial, retroactive application of
McMahon "should not be unduly burdensome to the litigants.
' 48
Cir. 1987); Chang v. Lin, 824 F.2d 219 (2d Cir. 1987); Noble v. Drexel Burnham Lambert,
Inc., 823 F.2d 849 (5th Cir. 1987); Nesslage v. York Securities, Inc., 823 F.2d 231 (8th Cir.
1987); Ketchum v. Prudential-Bache Securities, Inc., 710 F. Supp. 300 (D. Kan. 1989); Williams
v. E.F. Hutton & Co., Inc., 1988 W.L. 15242 (D.D.C. 1988), aff'd., 871 F.2d 1150 (D.C.
Cir. 1989); Gilmore v. Shearson/American Express Co., 668 F. Supp. 314 (S.D.N.Y. 1987);
Goldberg v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., 1987 W.L. 31604 (N.D. Ill. 1987); Helfricht v.
Jeffries & Co., 1987 W.L. 124777 (D.N.J. 1987).
42. 823 F.2d 849 (5th Cir. 1987).
43. Noble v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., 823 F.2d 849, 850 (6th Cir. 1987).
44. Id. at 850 (quoting Saint Francis College v. AI-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 698 (1987)).
45. Id. at 850 (citing Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97 (1971)).
46. 404 U.S. 97, 106-07 (1971).
47. Noble, 823 F.2d at 850-51. As the Noble court stated:
First, McMahon "establish[es] a new principle of law ... by overruling clear
past precedent" of this Circuit.... On the other hand, McMahon does not come
out of the blue; in one aspect, it builds logically on an unswerving line of Supreme
Court cases expanding the reach of arbitration agreements and affirming the impor-
tance of the Arbitration Act in the face of judicial hostility and the usual objec-
tions .... Second, the strong federal policy in favor of arbitration-and the absence
of any federal policy favoring securities litigation-suggests that the rule should be
applied retroactively. Third, as to the equities in this particular case, Mr. Noble has
the usual claim of unfairness bestowed on any litigant when the rules are changed
against him in the middle of the game ... ; we simply could not accept any claim
that he would not have entered into these non-negotiable pre-printed agreements had
he realized that 1934 Act claims would turn out to be arbitrable. Moreover, McMahon
alters only the forum for resolving this dispute and not Mr. Noble's substantive
rights.
48. Id. at 851.
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The issue was put to rest by the Rodriguez decision where the Supreme
Court squarely addressed the issue.4 9 The Court applied the customary rule
of retroactive application-that the lav announced in the Court's decision
controls the case at bar.5 0 Using the Chevron guidelines, the Court ruled
that:
Although our decision to overrule Wilko establishes a new principle
of law for arbitration agreements under the Securities Act, this
ruling furthers the purposes and effect of the Arbitration Act
without undermining those of the Securities Act. Today's ruling,
moreover, does not produce "substantial inequitable results," id.
at 107, 92 S. Ct. at 355, for petitioners do not make any serious
allegation that they agreed to arbitrate future disputes relating to
their investment contracts in reliance on Wilko's holding that such
agreements would be held unenforceable by the courts. Our conclu-
sion is reinforced by our assessment that resort to the arbitration
process does not inherently undermine any of the substantive rights
afforded to petitioners under the Securities Act.
5
1
4. Other Securities Laws Claims
Claims Under Sections 15 and 20 of the Exchange Act. The Ninth
Circuit in Badart v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. found no
distinction between claims arising under section 10(b) of the Exchange Act
and those arising under sections 15 and 20 of the Exchange Act.
5 2
Investment Adviser Act Claims. The Arizona Court of Appeals ruled
in Rocz v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc. that if a private right of action
exists under the Investment Advisers Act, federal law permits arbitration of
the claim. 3 The court rejected the plaintiff's contention that Congress
intended to make an exception to the Arbitration Act for claims brought
under the Investment Advisors Act and ordered the plaintiff's claims to
arbitration.
State Securities Law Claims. The Federal Arbitration Act created federal
substantive law which preempts state law prohibiting arbitration of certain
claims.14 Allegations of violations of state securities law have been held
arbitrable pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act.
55
49. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express Co., 109 S. Ct. 1917 (1989).
50. Id. at 1922.
51. Id.
52. Badart v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 823 F.2d 333 (9th Cir. 1987).
53. Rocz v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., 154 Ariz. 462, 743 P.2d 971 (1987).
54. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984); Osterneck v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 841 F.2d 508 (3d Cir. 1988); Sager v. Dist. Ct. for Second Jud.
Dist., 698 P.2d 250 (Colo. 1985).
55. See Doctors Assoc., Inc. v. McCrory, 501 So. 2d 126 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987)
(holding that allegations of violations of Florida securities laws arising out of franchise
agreement were arbitrable pursuant to Federal Arbitration Act).
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B. Stay of Court Proceedings Pending Arbitration
1. Intertwining Doctrine Rejected
In Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd 6 the Supreme Court addressed
the complexities created when a complaint joins an arbitrable state law
claim with a nonarbitrable federal claim arising out of the same transaction.
Prior to the 1985 Byrd decision, several circuits had developed an "inter-
twining doctrine" in refusing to refer arbitrable claims to arbitration:
When arbitrable and nonarbitrable claims arise out of the same
transaction, and are sufficiently intertwined factually and legally,
the district court ... may in its discretion deny arbitration as to
the arbitrable claims and try all the claims together in federal
court.
57
The Byrd Court observed that while many courts acknowledge the
strong federal policy in favor of enforcing agreements, courts have not
compelled arbitration because of the need to preserve and protect courts'
exclusive jurisdiction over federal securities claims as well as for the sake
of efficiency, such as avoiding redundant, bifurcated proceedings. 8 Rejecting
this reasoning, the Byrd Court unanimously decided "that the Arbitration
Act requires district courts to compel arbitration of pendent arbitrable
claims when one of the parties files a motion to compel, even where the
result would be the possibly inefficient maintenance of separate proceedings
in different forums."5 9 The Court noted that the overriding goal of the
Arbitration Act was not "to promote the expeditious resolution of claims,"
but to ensure "judicial enforcement of privately made agreements to arbi-
trate."60
2. Post-Byrd Developments
As a result of the Federal Arbitration Act and the Byrd decision, a
court must stay litigation of all claims subject to arbitration, but has
discretion whether to stay or proceed with the nonarbitrable claims. 61 A
court, therefore, must decide whether to stay judicial proceedings pending
arbitration of related claims under the circumstances of the case.
56. 470 U.S. 213 (1985).
57. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 216-17 (1985) (citing Belke v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 693 F.2d 1023 (lth Cir. 1982)); Miley v.
Oppenheimer & Co., 637 F.2d 318, 334-37 (5th Cir. 1981); Cunningham v. Dean Witter
Reynolds, Inc., 550 F. Supp. 578 (E.D. Cal. 1982).
58. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 217 (1985).
59. Id.
60. Id. at 219.
61. See Continental Serv. Life and Health Ins. Co. v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 664
F. Supp. 997, 1001 (M.D. La. 1987); Chang v. Lin, 824 F.2d 219, 222 (2d. Cir. 1987); Schultz
v. Robinson-Humphrey/American Express Co., 666 F. Supp. 219 (M.D. Ga. 1987).
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Because there have been varying interpretations of Byrd by the lower
courts, there has been no uniform response where some but not all of the
claims are subject to arbitration. One court has ordered a stay of the
remaining judicial proceedings pending arbitration,6 2 while other courts have
opted to allow the arbitration and federal court litigation to proceed apace.
6
1
Courts, however, more frequently have denied motions seeking a stay of
the litigation of nonarbitrable federal claims pending arbitration of related
arbitrable claims. 64 This permits the parties to utilize broad federal discovery
which is not available in arbitration and, in a few "efficient" federal
districts, to obtain a trial of the facts before a hearing is held in the
arbitration.
3. Judicial Decisions
'33 Act Claims. Prior to Rodriguez, the nonarbitrability of '33 Act
claims provided the backdrop against ivhich varying judicial interpretations
of Byrd were displayed. The anti-arbitration Second Circuit ruled in Chang
v. Lin that "arbitration and federal litigation should proceed simultaneously
absent compelling reasons to stay the litigation." 65 The court agreed with
Justice White's concurring opinion in Byrd:
Once it is decided that [litigation of federal securities claims and
arbitration of pendent state claims] are to go forward independently,
the concern for speedy resolution suggests that neither should be
delayed. While the impossibility of the lawyers being in two places
at once may require some accommodation in scheduling ... the
heavy presumption should be that the arbitration and the lawsuit
will each proceed in its normal course. 6
The Chang court found no evidence in the record to rebut the "heavy
presumption" against the deferral of plaintiff's then non-arbitrable claims
arising under the '33 Act, and reversed the district court's ruling which
stayed the litigation of those claims pending arbitration of pendent state
claims. 67
In Schultz v. Robinson-Humphrey/American Express Co. however, the
district court ordered a stay of the federal court proceedings pending the
62. Schultz v. Robinson-Humphrey/American Express Co., 666 F. Supp. 219 (M.D. Ga.
1987).
63. See Chang v. Lin, 824 F.2d 219 (2d Cir. 1987); Creative Securities Corp. v. Bear
Steams & Co., Inc., 671 F. Supp. 961 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), aff'd, 847 F.2d 834 (2d Cir. 1988);
Peterson v. Shearson/American Express Co., 849 F.2d 464 (10th Cir. 1988); Continental Serv.
Life & Health Ins. Co.v. A.G. Edwards, 664 F. Supp. 997 (M.D. La. 1987).
64. See supra note 63.
65. Chang, 824 F.2d at 223.
66. Id. at 223 (quoting Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 225 (1985)
(White, J., concurring).
67. Id.
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outcome of arbitration. 8 Upon review of the relevant case law, the court
was of the view that Byrd did not stand for the following proposition:
[t]hat a district court is absolutely prohibited from staying its
proceedings pending resolution of the arbitration matters. Rather,
Byrd merely requires that the district court must make a case-by-
case decision as to whether a stay would be in the interest of both
efficiency and judicial economy.69
The court reviewed the plaintiff's claims arising under section 12(2) of the
'33 Act and found those claims insubstantial compared to the arbitrable
claims, and ordered a stay of the proceedings on the section 12(2) claims
pending the outcome of arbitration.
70
Class Actions. The issue of bifurcated proceedings also can arise in
connection with class actions. For example, the court in Kronfeld v. Advest,
Inc.7' compelled the plaintiffs' claims to arbitration while acknowledging
that other members of the class would be allowed to proceed in a judicial
forum.72 In Kronfeld the plaintiffs were buyers of public utility bonds issued
to fund the development of nuclear power plants. The plaintiffs argued that
the complexity of the claims and the prospect that identical claims of other
buyers who did not sign customer agreements containing arbitration provi-
sions would be litigated in different forums precluded the use of arbitration.73
Rejecting the plaintiffs' arguments, the court, citing McMahon, said that
the arbitrability of Exchange Act and RICO claims has been established
conclusively 74 and that the plaintiffs' mistrust of the arbitration process was
repudiated expressly by the Supreme Court in McMahon.7 Further, the
holding of Byrd rendered unpersuasive the plaintiffs' claim of judicial
inefficiency. 76
Choice of Law Clauses. In Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Trustees
of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ. 77 the Supreme Court recently held that
the Federal Arbitration Act does not preempt a state law permitting a court
to stay arbitration in certain situations where the parties have agreed that
their contract, including the arbitration agreement therein, is to be governed
by that state's law.78
68. Schultz v. Robinson-Humphrey/American Express Co., 666 F. Supp. 219, 221 (M.D.
Ga. 1987).
69. Id. at 210 (citing Sevinor v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 807 F.2d
16 (Ist Cir. 1986)).
70. Schultz, 666 F. Supp. at 221.
71. 675 F. Supp. 1449 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
72. Kronfeld v. Advest, Inc., 675 F. Supp. 1449, 1452-53 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
73. Id.
74. Id. at 1452.
75. Id. at 1453.
76. Id.
77. 109 S. Ct. 1248 (1989).
78. Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ.,
109 S. Ct. 1248, 1254-56 (1989).
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The parties in Volt had agreed to arbitrate all disputes arising out of
the contract, and that the contract would be governed by the law of "the
place where the Project is located," namely California.7 9 When a compen-
sation dispute arose, the defendant moved to compel arbitration. Pursuant
to a California statute, the plaintiff objected to arbitration. 80 The defendant's
motion to compel arbitration was denied by the state trial court. The
decision was affirmed by the California Court of Appeals, which found
that even though the parties' contract involved interstate commerce, such
contracts are generally governed by the Federal Arbitration Act, and that
the Federal Arbitration Act does not provide for the type of relief set forth
in the California statutes. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court found that
application proper.8' Acknowledging that the Federal Arbitration Act pre-
empts state laws which render agreements to arbitrate unenforceable,8 the
Court found that "[iut does not follow ... that the federal law has preclusive
effect in a case where the parties have chosen in their [arbitration] agreement
to abide by state rules. ' 83 To so require would "force the parties to arbitrate
in a manner contrary to their agreement."
'8 4
The Supreme Court, in affirming the California Court of Appeals'
decision, held that the right to compel arbitration under the Federal Arbi-
tration Act occurs only in cases where the parties have agreed to arbitrate,
whereas in Volt the parties agreed that the contract and the arbitration
clause therein would be governed by California law which permitted the
stay of arbitration in certain circumstances." The Court further found that
the statute did not undermine the federal policy favoring arbitration by
rendering unenforceable agreements to arbitrate, but rather concerned the
conduct or procedure of arbitration.86
C. Appealability of Orders Granting or Denying a Stay
In the past, orders denying or granting a stay of judicial proceedings
pending arbitration were reviewable on appeal as either:
1) injunctions under 28 U.S.C. section 1292(a)(1);
2) collateral orders under Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp.,
337 U.S. 541 (1949);
3) final decisions under 29 U.S.C. section 1291;
4) permissive appeals under 28 U.S.C. section 1292(b); or
5) by writ of mandamus.
8 7
79. Id. at 1251.
80. Id.




85. Id. at 1253.
86. Id. at 1253-1254.
87. Jolley v. Paine Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 864 F.2d 402, 403 (5th Cir. 1989).
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A recent Supreme Court decision"8 and an amendment to the Federal
Arbitration Act 9 impact the appealability of orders granting or denying a
stay of judicial proceedings pending arbitration.
In March 1988, the Supreme Court in Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v.
Mayacamas Corp. overruled the Enelow-Ettelson doctrine, declaring it "in
the modem world of litigation, a total fiction, . . . unsound in theory,
unworkable and arbitrary in practice, and unnecessary to achieve any
legitimate goals." 9 Under the doctrine, an order by a federal court staying
or refusing to stay its own proceedings was appealable under 28 U.S.C.
section 1291(a)(2) as a grant or denial of an injunction if the order was
made "in a historically legal action on the basis of a historically equitable
defense or counterclaim." 91 While the Gulfstream holding "prevents inter-
locutory review of district court orders on the basis of historical circum-
stances that have no relevance to modern litigation," the Court pointed out
that appellate jurisdiction could be asserted under 28 U.S.C. sections 1291,
1292(a)(1), and 1292(b), as well as by application for writ of mandamus.2
Subsequent to the Gulfstream decision, several decisions have addressed
the appealability of orders granting or denying a stay of judicial proceedings
pending arbitration. The Seventh Circuit in Crist v. Millere3 dismissed the
appeal of the defendants who were seeking reversal of a district court order
which denied a stay in judicial proceedings pending the outcome of arbitra-
tion.9 4 The defendants argued that the order was appealable under the
collateral order doctrine.9s While acknowledging that "the Supreme Court
left open the possibility that the denial of a motion to stay judicial
88. Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp., 108 S. Ct. 1133 (1988).
89. Judicial Improvements & Access to Justice Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-702, §
1019, 102 Stat. 4642, 4670-71 (1988).
90. Gulfstream, 108 S. Ct. at 1142.
91. Id. at 1139.
92. Id. at 1142. According to the Gulfstream Court:
This holding will not prevent interlocutory review of district court orders when
such review is truly needed. Section 1292(a)(1) will, of course, continue to provide
appellate jurisdiction over orders that grant or deny injunctions and orders that have
the practical effect of granting or denying injunctions and have 'serious, perhaps,
irreparable, consequence.'... As for orders that were appealable under § 1292(a)(1)
solely by virtue of the Enelow-Ettelson doctrine, they may, in appropriate circum-
stances, be reviewed under the collateral order doctrine of § 1291, . . . and the
permissive appeal provision of § 1292(b), as well as by application for writ of
mandamus. Our holding today merely prevents interlocutory review of district court
orders on the basis of historical circumstances that have no relevance to modern
litigation. (internal citations omitted.)
Id. at 1142-43.
93. 846 F.2d 1143 (7th Cir. 1988).
94. Crist v. Miller, 846 F.2d 1143, 1144 (7th Cir. 1988).
95. Id. Under the collateral order doctrine, a non-final order will be "deemed final for
purposes of appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1219, if it (1) conclusively determines an issue (2)
separate from the merits of the litigation, and, if postponing review until there is a final
judgment in the litigation would (3) irrevocably harm the appellant." Id. at 1144.
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proceedings might in a particular case be appealable as a collateral order,"96
the Crist court declined jurisdiction because the defendants "made only a
perfunctory effort to show that the denial of their application for stay was
a collateral order. ' 97 Judge Posner observed that defendants made no
showing that the arbitrability issue would not be effectively reviewed if a
final judgment were entered for the appellees. The Court stated that if
upon review the court determined that the appellants had a valid contractual
right to arbitrate the claims, the judgment would be set aside and the matter
referred to arbitration.93 Posner acknowledged that:
[t]here will be wasted motion, no doubt, but that is always true
when a sound defense interposed early in a litigation is erroneously
rejected. It is the price we pay for a final judgment rule. The
exceptions to the rule are narrow, and do not include mere incon-
venience to a party wanting to take an interlocutory appeal.9
The First Circuit in Isabel Romeu Vda de Fuertes v. Drexel Burnham
Lambert, Inc.'0° also dismissed an appeal from an order directing arbitration
and denied a petition for mandamus. Citing Gulfstream, the First Circuit
in de Fuertes concluded that it had no jurisdiction to review the order
referring the case to arbitration because the ruling was not a denial of an
injunction under 28 U.S.C. section 1292(a)(1) nor reviewable under the
collateral order doctrine.10' Quoting from the Crist opinion, the court
acknowledged that inconvenience may result if the lower court's decision
was in error, but that "is the price of the final judgment rule and does not
constitute irreparable harm."' 10 2
The Second Circuit also has addressed the appealability of an order
denying or granting a stay pending arbitration of a dispute. In McDonnell
Douglas Finance Corp. v. Pennsylvania Power & Light Co.'01 Pennsylvania
Power & Light Company ("PPL") moved for a stay of proceedings pending
compelled arbitration. The district court denied PPL's motion and PPL
subsequently appealed."l4 The Second Circuit initially rejected the appeal on
several grounds. 05 Citing Gulfstream the court explained that the order was
not appealable under 28 U.S.C. section 1292(a) nor any of the other
procedures outlined in Gulfstream, with the exception of the permissive




100. 885 F.2d 10 (lst Cir. 1988).
101. Isabel Romeu Vda de Fuertes v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., 885 F.2d 10, 11
(Ist Cir. 1988).
102. Id. at 12.
103. 849 F.2d 761 (2d Cir. 1988).
104. McDonnell Douglas Finance Corp. v. Pennsylvania Power & Light Co., 849 F.2d
761 (2d Cir. 1988).
105. Id. at 764.
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appeal provision of section 1292(b)."06 The Second Circuit, therefore, re-
manded the case to determine whether the appeal should be certified under
28 U.S.C. section 1292(b) "as a controlling question of law as to which
there is a substantial ground for a difference of opinion and that immediate
appeal would materially advance the litigation."' 7 Subsequently, the district
court certified the appeal, and the Second Circuit, finding that the narrow
scope of the particular agreement to arbitrate did not cover disputes arising
out of claims regarding the good faith of PPL, affirmed the district court's
order denying a stay of proceedings pending arbitration. 08
The Fifth Circuit in Jolley v. Paine Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc.19
dismissed the plaintiff's appeal from the district court's order staying
proceedings pending arbitration. The Fifth Circuit stated that under Gulf-
stream:
[T]he only appellate jurisdiction over an order granting or denying
a stay pending arbitration, entered as part of a continuing proceed-
ing where the district court retains jurisdiction, would be found in
a permissive appeal under § 1292(b) or a writ of mandamus." 0
The Fifth Circuit in Jolley concluded that it lacked jurisdiction over the
matter because the district court denied the plaintiff's motion for a section
1292(b) certification, and the plaintiff did not seek a writ of mandamus."'
1. Amendment to Federal Arbitration Act
The appealability of arbitration-related orders also was addressed in
recent legislation. Effective November 19, 1988, Congress amended the
Federal Arbitration Act by adding section 15 on appeals."
2
106. Id.
107. Id. at 765.
108. McDonnel Douglass Finance Corp. v. Pennsylvania Power & Light Co., 858 F.2d
825, 833-34 (2d Cir. 1988).
109. 864 F.2d 402 (5th Cir. 1989) (supplementary opinion No. 88-3179) (affirming result
of earlier decision stating that recent amendment to Federal Arbitration Act did not change
result).
110. Jolley v. Paine Webber, Jackson & Curtis, 864 F.2d 402, 405 (5th Cir. 1989).
111. Id.
112. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 15 (1988) provides:
Appeals
(a) An appeal may be taken from-
(1) an order-
(A) refusing a stay of action under section 3 of this title,
(B) denying a petition under section 4 of this title to order arbitration to
proceed
(C) denying an application under section 206 of this title to compel arbitra-
tion
(D) confirming or denying confirmation of an award or partial award, or
(E) modifying, correcting, or vacating an award;
(2) an interlocutory order granting, continuing, or modifying an injunction against
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Observing that "the new section clarifies congressional intent regarding
appealability of arbitration orders,""' 3 the Fifth Circuit in Turboff v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc."4 summarized the language of the
section as intending to:
Permit interlocutory appeals of orders favoring litigation over ar-
bitration while precluding our jurisdiction to review an interlocutory
order that either: (1) stays an action in court pending arbitration,
(2) directs or compels arbitration, or (3) refuses to enjoin an
arbitration governed by the Federal Arbitration Act." 5
The court noted, however, that section 15 still permits an appeal taken
"from final judgments concerning arbitration or pursuant to a 28 U.S.C.
§ 1292(b) certificate." '"16 Finding that the new section does not affect
substantive rights, but merely "introduces procedural changes to the en-
forcement of arbitration clauses," the court applied section 15 retroactively
to the plaintiff's appeal of an order staying proceedings pending arbitration
of his claims.'
7
D. Challenges to Arbitration Agreements and Other Contractual Issues
The validity of arbitration agreements is frequently challenged by cus-
tomers (and their counsel) who would prefer to litigate their claims in the
federal courts. Some of the more common arguments advanced are discussed
below as well as the appropriate forum in which such issues should be
decided.
1. Forum That Should Rule on the Challenge
Inducement by Fraud. When a customer challenges the validity of an
agreement to arbitrate (i.e., that the contract, including the agreement to
arbitrate, was obtained by fraud), a threshold question is raised: In what
forum must such a challenge be asserted and decided?
an arbitration that is subject to this title; or
(3) a final decision with respect to an arbitration that is subject to this title.
(b) Except as otherwise provided in section 1292(b) of title 28, an appeal may not
be taken from an interlocutory order-
(1) granting a stay of any action under section 3 of this title;
(2) directing arbitration to proceed under section 4 of this title;
(3) compelling arbitration under section 206 of this title; or
(4) refusing to enjoin arbitration that is subject to this title;
Judicial Improvements & Access to Justice Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-702, § 1019, 102
Stat. 4642, 4670-71 (1988).
113. Turboff v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 867 F.2d 1518, 1520 (5th
Cir. 1989).
114. 867 F.2d 1518 (5th Cir. 1989).
115. Turboff v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 867 F.2d 1518, 1520 (5th
Cir. 1989).
116. Id.
117. Id. at 1521.
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Section 4 of the Arbitration Act requires courts to direct the parties to
proceed to arbitration "upon being satisfied that the making of the agree-
ment for arbitration or the failure to comply therewith is not an is-
sue. .... ,,1s However, if there is a genuine issue of fact relating to the
making of the agreement to arbitrate, the Arbitration Act provides the right
to a jury trial on the issue. 119
For example, the Supreme Court held in Prima Paint v. Flood &
Conklin Mfg. Co. that "if the claim is fraud in the inducement of the
arbitration clause itself-an issue that goes to the 'making' of the agreement
to arbitrate-the federal court may proceed to adjudicate it. But the
statutory language does not permit the federal court to consider claims of
fraud in the inducement of contract generally.'
'120
Forgeries on customer agreements, which result in doubt being cast
upon the customer's intent ever to arbitrate claims,' 2' and misrepresentations
by broker-dealers relating to the singing of the arbitration agreement,'2 are
examples of issues on which courts order trials. On the other hand, claims
alleging unconscionability, coercion, or confusion in signing the contract-
issues going to the formation of the entire contract-are to be determined
by an arbitrator.
23
Some courts have adopted a broad reading of Prima Paint and have
sent to arbitration claims of inducement by fraud that arguably related to
both the principal agreement and the arbitration clause in general. 24 The
court in Rush v. Oppenheimer & Co. Inc., however, criticized this result in
a well-reasoned opinion.'2 According to the Rush court, "the relief that
Prima Paint and the [Federal Arbitration] Act provide investors from the
fraudulent procurement of their assent to arbitration would be illusory if
the federal court did not retain jurisdiction over claims that statements
pertaining to the underlying agreement were fraudulent with respect to the
arbitration agreement .... Prima Paint requires a federal court to resolve
allegations of fraud that pertain to both the principal agreement as a whole
and the arbitration agreement in particular."'1
26
The Unconscionable Agreement. Generally, an adhesion contract is one
printed on a standard form by a party who holds a position of power so
superior relative to the other party that it is effectively capable of imposing
118. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1970).
119. Id.
120. Prima Paint v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 403-04 (1967).
121. Russolillo v. Thomson McKinnon Securities, Inc., 694 F. Supp. 1042 (D. Conn.
1988); Dougherty v. Mieczkowski, 661 F. Supp. 267 (D. Del. 1987); Blatt v. Shearson Lehman/
American Express Co., No. 84 Civ. 7715-CSH (S.D.N.Y. July 16, 1985).
122. Rush v. Oppenheimer & Co., Inc., 638 F. Supp. 872 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
123. Coleman v. Prudential-Bache Securities, Inc., 802 F.2d 1350, 1352 (11th Cir. 1986).
124. See, e.g., Bitkowski v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 833 F.2d 1011
(6th Cir. 1987); Bhatia v. Johnston, 818 F.2d 418 (5th Cir. 1987); Coleman v. Prudential-
Bache Securities, Inc., 802 F.2d 1350 (11th Cir. 1986).
125. Rush v. Oppenheimer & Co., 681 F. Supp. 1045 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
126. Id. at 1053.
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terms. 127 The party challenging the contract must overcome a strong pre-
sumption of validity. 1' This issue would be determined by a court or
arbitration panel on the basis of the same analysis as the inducement by
fraud challenge to the arbitration agreement. Where courts have entertained
claims that the arbitration agreement is a contract of adhesion, court
decisions have turned on specific facts, and courts have applied a variety
of theories to support their conclusions.
29
Although some industry-generated form contracts are regarded with
suspicion, courts normally will not reexamine and reform agreements merely
to avoid inequitable results. A few courts have thrown out contracts that
do not fall within the reasonable expectation of the parties, while others
will set aside agreements only if "unduly oppressive or unconscionable."' 30
Faulty Execution of the Agreement. Another common argument ad-
vanced by a customer attacking the validity of an- arbitration agreement
focuses on the absence or authenticity of his signature. However, section 2
of the Arbitration Act only requires the arbitration agreement to be in
writing, and "[i]t is well settled that an agreement to arbitrate need not be
signed by the party to be enforceable.' 3' For example, in Schena v.
127. Pierson v' Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 742 F.2d 334, 339 (7th Cir. 1984). See, e.g.,
M/V American Queen v. San Diego Marine Constr. Corp., 708 F.2d 1483, 1489 (9th. Cir.
1983); Chandler v. Aero Mayflower Transit Co., 374 F.2d 129, 135 n.ll (4th Cir. 1967).
128. Finkle v. A.G. Becker Paribas, Inc., 622 F. Supp. 1505, 1512 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
129. See, e.g., Cohen v. Wedbush Noble Cooke Inc., 841 F.2d 282 (9th Cir._1988) (stating
that state law adhesion contract principles may not be invoked to bar arbitrability of disputes
under Arbitration Act); Pierson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 742 F.2d 334, 339 (7th Cir.
1984) (stating that arbitration clause must not be commercially unreasonable and adhering
party must not have had reasonable opportunity to understand clause); Finkle v. A.G., Becker
Paribas, Inc., 622 F. Supp. 1505, 1512 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (clause not within reasonable expec-
tations of party or clause is within reasonable expectations of party but is unduly oppressive,
unconscionable, or against public policy); Reynolds- Securities, Inc. v. Macquown, 459 F. Supp.
943 (N.D. Pa. 1978) (must show valid public policy reason- for refusing to enforce arbitration
agreement entered into by consenting legally competent persons); Arkoosh v. Dean Witter &
Co., 415 F. Supp. 535, 544 (D. Neb. 1976) (plaintiff failed to present evidence that he would
be denied right to present evidence in arbitration proceeding or that arbitration agreement
seriously altered his expectations).
130. See Nesslage v. York Securities, Inc., 823 F.2d 231, 234 (8th Cir. 1987) ("[t]he use
of a standard form contract between two parties of admittedly unequal bargaining power does
not invalidate an otherwise valid contractual provision. To be invalid the provision at issue
must be unconscionable.") (quoting Webb v. R. Rowland & Co., 800 F.2d 803, 807 (8th Cir.
1986), and citing Surman v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 733 F.2d 59, 61 n.2 (8th
Cir. 1984)); Hurlbut v. Gantshar, 674 F. Supp. 385, 389 (D. Mass. 1987) (agreement to
arbitrate disputes before independent panel of arbitrators of customer's choosing, even though
imposed by terms of standard form- contract, is.not unconscionable); Hall v. Prudential-Bache
Securities, Inc., 662 F. Supp. 468 (C.D. Cal. 1987) (use of standard form contract was not
inherently unfair or evidence that agreements were products of contract of adhesion).
131. Blatt v. Shearson Lehman/American Express Co., [1986-87 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 92,976, at 94,796 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 31, 1986). See, e.g., Creative Securities
Corp. v. Bear Stearns & Co., 671 F. Supp. 961, 965 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); First Citizens Mun.
Corp. v. Pershing Div. of Donaldson Lufkin & Jenrette Securities Corp., 546 F. Supp. 884,
887 (N.D. Ga. 1982); Starkman v. Seroussi, 377 F. Supp. 518, 520 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). See also
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PaineWebber, Inc., the court granted the defendant's motion to compel
arbitration despite the plaintiff's claims that the signature on one of two
client agreements, both of which contained arbitration provisions, was
forged. 132 The plaintiff did not dispute the validity of the signature on an
earlier dated agreement. Similarly, in First Citizens Municipal Corp. v.
Pershing Division of Donaldson Lufkin & Jenerette Corp.33 the customer
opposed the defendant's motion to compel arbitration on the grounds that
the defendant never signed and returned the customer agreement containing
the arbitration provision. The court rejected this argument, finding that, by
their conduct, the parties had adopted the agreement.
Nonexistence of the Customer Agreement. There have been cases where
the plaintiff opposed the defendant's motion to compel arbitration on the
grounds that no document evincing the intent of the broker and customer
to arbitrate could be produced. The courts have come down on both sides
of this issue. In Tilton v. Prudential-Bache Securities, Inc., 3 the court
refused to compel arbitration because the defendant was unable to produce
the original agreement or a copy containing the clause. Similarly, the court
in Nicholas A. Califano, M.D., Inc. v. Shearson/Lehman Brothers, Inc.
held that the arbitration clause in the customer agreement for the personal
account of the president of the corporate plaintiff did not apply to the
plaintiff's corporate account. 135 Though Califano opened an account at
Shearson in the corporation's name, Shearson had no record of sending the
agreement, and no such agreement was executed specifically for the cor-
porate account. The court held that, even assuming Califano had received
the agreement for the corporate account, the corporation could not be
bound by the agreement without having signed it. In Creative Securities
Corp. v. Bear Stearns & Co., however, the court compelled arbitration of
the dispute between the parties even though the standard customer agreement
containing the arbitration provision could not be located.
36
Breach of Fiduciary Duty to Explain the Arbitration Clause. Plaintiffs
frequently assert that brokers owe a duty to their customers to explain the
significance of the arbitration clause. The court in Rush v. Oppenheimer &
Co., Inc., however, held that "brokers are not required as a matter of law
to disclose or explain arbitration clauses to their customers.'
1 37
A/S Custodia v. Lessin Int'l, Inc., 503 F.2d 318, 320 (2d Cir. 1974); Fisser v. International
Bank, 282 F.2d 231, 233 (2d Cir. 1960); In re AAAcon Auto Transp., Inc., & Teafatiller, 334
F. Supp. 1042, 1043 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
132. Schena v. PaineWebber, Inc., [1987-88 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
93,517, at 97,300 (D. Mass. Aug. 24, 1987).
133. First Citizens Mun. Corp. v. Pershing Div. of Donaldson Lufkin & Jenrette Securities
Corp., 546 F. Supp. 884 (N.D. Ga. 1982).
134. Tilton v. Prudential-Bache Securities, Inc., [1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 93,241, at 96,170 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 1987).
135. Nicholas A. Califano, M.D., Inc. v. Shearson Lehman Bros., Inc., 690 F. Supp.
1354 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
136. Creative Securities Corp. v. Bear Stearns & Co., 671 F. Supp. 961 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
137. Rush v. Oppenheimer & Co., 681 F. Supp. 1045, 1052 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). See also
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Waiver of the Right to Arbitrate. Like any contractual right, a party
may waive his right to arbitrate a dispute. In Nesslage v. York Securities,
Inc., the Eighth Circuit held that "[iun view of the strong federal policy in
favor of arbitration, 'any doubts concerning ... waiver, delay or a like
defense to arbitrability' should be resolve in favor of arbitration."'' 38 The
party asserting waiver bears a heavy burden of proof.3 9 To determine if a
party has waived the right to arbitrate, courts will consider the following
factors:
(1) whether the party's actions are inconsistent with the right to
arbitrate;
(2) whether the litigation machinery has been substantially invoked
and the parties were well into preparation of a lawsuit before the
party notified the opposing party of an intent to arbitrate;
(3) whether a party either requested arbitration enforcement close
to the trial date or delayed for a long period before seeking a stay;
(4) whether a defendant seeking arbitration filed a counterclaim
without asking for a stay of the proceedings;
(5) whether important intervening steps [e.g., taking advantage of
judicial discovery procedures not available in arbitration] had taken
place; and
(6) whether the delay affected, misled, or prejudiced the opposing
party. 140
Courts recently have had to address the waiver question when deciding
whether to apply retroactively the holding of McMahon. Typically in such
cases, a party will seek to compel arbitration of claims which arose before
McMahon and, therefore, were non-arbitrable. In Peterson v. Shearsoni
Cohen v. Wedbush Noble Cooke Inc., 841 F.2d 282 (9th Cir. 1988); Pierson v. Dean Witter
Reynolds, Inc., 742 F.2d 334, 339 (7th Cir. 1984); Rush v. Oppenheimer & Co., 638 F. Supp.
872 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); Adams v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., [1985-86 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 92,328, at 92,173 (W.D. Okla. Sep. 20, 1985); Pelzman
v. Paine Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., [1983-84 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
99,408, at 96,336 (D.D.C. July 12, 1983).
138. Nesslage v. York Securities, Inc., 823 F.2d 231, 234 (8th Cir. 1987) (quoting Moss
H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983)). See also
Patten Securities Corp. v. Diamond Greyhound & Genetics, Inc., 819 F.2d 400 (3d Cir. 1987);
Fraser v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 817 F.2d 250 (4th Cir. 1987); Fisher
v. A.G. Becker Paribas, Inc., 791 F.2d 691, 694 (9th Cir. 1986); Kayne v. PaineWebber, Inc.,
684 F. Supp. 978, 980 (N.D. Ill. 1988); Buy-Rite Costume Jewelry, Inc.v. Albin, 676 F. Supp.
433 (D.R.I. 1988); Gilmore v. Shearson/American Express Co., 668 F. Supp. 314 (S.D.N.Y.
1987); Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc. v. Warner, 665 F. Supp. 1549 (S.D. Fla. 1987); Norden
v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 739 P.2d 914 (Colo. App. 1987).
139. Fisher v. A.G. Becker Paribas, Inc., 791 F.2d 691, 694 (9th Cir. 1986).
140. Peterson v. Shearson/American Express Co., 849 F.2d 464, 467-68 (10th Cir. 1988)
(citing Reid Burton Constr., Inc. v. Carpenters Dist. Council of S. Colo., 614 F.2d 698, 702
(10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 824 (1980)). See also Ketchum v. Prudential-Bache
Securities, Inc., 710 F. Supp. 300 (D. Kan. 1989); Ketchum v. Almahurst Bloodstock IV, 685
F. Supp. 786 (D. Kan. 1988).
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American Express Co. 14 1 and Kayne v. PaineWebber, Inc.1 42 the courts ruled
that because the claims arising under the federal securities laws and RICO
were not arbitrable at the time the complaint was filed, the parties had not
waived their right to compel arbitration. In C.D. Anderson & Co., Inc. v.
Lemos, 43 however, the court held that the broker waived the right to litigate
the claim in a federal court because the broker had submitted federal
securities law and RICO claims to arbitration. The court, therefore, found
that it did not have to decide whether McMahon should be applied retro-
actively. The broker in Lemos had argued against the retroactive application
of McMahon, and contended that the claims had been submitted to arbi-
tration when they were not arbitrable at that time and, therefore, could not
have waived the right to litigate the claims in court.
Impact of SEC Rule 15[c]2-2. In 1983 the SEC adopted Rule 15[c]2-2
. in order to address regulatory concerns arising from the inclusion in
standard form customer agreements of predispute arbitration clauses (i.e.,
agreements requiring customers to submit to arbitration all future dis-
putes).'" 44 The rule required insertion in customer arbitration agreements
language disclosing the potential nonapplicability of arbitration to federal
securities claims. 45 The SEC, in adopting the rule, was responding to existing
case law including Wilko and lower federal court decisions extending Wilko
to '34 Act claims.' 46 The SEC found that the inclusion of predispute
agreements to arbitrate in customer contracts "without disclosure of their
inapplicability to federal securities claims was misleading, thus constituting
a 'fraudulent, manipulative or deceptive act or practice within the meaning
of the Exchange Act.'" 1
47
As a result of the McMahon ruling, the arbitrability of '34 Act claims
no longer were questioned, while doubts relating to the continuing nonar-
bitrability of '33 Act claims were voiced. Recognizing the impact of McMahon,
the SEC rescinded Rule 15[c]2-2 on October 15, 1987,148 admitting that the
rule was "no longer appropriate in light of case law developments."'149
Subsequent to the rescission of Rule 15[c]2-2, courts split on the effect to
be given arbitration provisions containing the language formerly required.
Some courts have applied retroactively the rescission of the rule, declaring
141. 849 F.2d 464 (10th Cir. 1988).
142. 684 F. Supp. 978 (N.D. Ill. 1988).
143. 832 F.2d 1097 (9th Cir. 1987).
144. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 25,034, [1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 84,163, at 88,886 (Oct. 15, 1987).
145. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 20,397, [1983-84 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 83,452, at 86,356 (Nov. 18, 1983).
146. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 25,034, [1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 84,163, at 88,886-87 (Oct. 15, 1987).
147. Id. at 88,887 (quoting Securities Exchange Act Release No. 20,397, [1983-84 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 83,452, at 86,356 (Nov. 18, 1983).
148. Id.
149. Id.
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that the language of the notice is no longer a bar to the arbitration 50 and,
thus, avoided deciding issues relating to violations of the rule. An opposite
conclusion was reached, however, in a recent New York case, Gugliotta v.
Evans & Co., Inc..15 1 In Gugliotta the defendants moved to stay the
proceedings and to compel arbitration pursuant to an arbitration provision
in the account opening documents. The court found preliminarily, however,
that the language used in the arbitration provision did not fully comply
with the standard set forth in the then in force Rule 15[c]2-2. According
to the court, the issue was ". . . whether despite, the rescission of the rule
after the lawsuit was filed, a broker who violated the [rule] ... should be
permitted to take advantage of its wrongdoing."' 52 Initially, the court
observed that "[a]greements to arbitrate are governed by settled principles
of contract law, and a party to such an agreement 'may assert general
contract defenses' to an action seeking to enforce an arbitration agree-
ment."' 5 3 Furthermore, "[t]he law is clear that agreements contrary to
public policy are void and unenforceable.' ' 4 While noting that the Mc-
Mahon decision and the rescission of the.rule had led some courts, such as
the Fifth Circuit, to apply the rescission of the rule retroactively, the court
refused to compel arbitration where one of the parties had acted in defiance
of the prior rule.'
In contrast, another court was unconcerned with retroactive application
of the rule's rescission because the rescission did not impair substantive
rights 5 6 and rejected the contention that the required Rule 15[c]2-2 notice
became a part of the customer's agreement. 157 The court found extensive
support in authorities for the concept that "the rule is merely a procedural
mechanism" and "does not create or preserve rights to litigate in federal
court, and does not alone prevent arbitration of federal securities claims."' 5 8
It should be noted, however, that the language required by former Rule
15[c]2-2 has been given teeth by several courts despite the rescission of the
rule and the holding of McMahon.Y5 9 For example, in Brick v. J. C. Bradford
& Co. the court denied a motion to compel arbitration of a customer's
claims under section 10(b) of the Exchange Act because the customer
agreement contained language (pursuant to the SEC rule) prohibiting arbi-
150. See Cohen v. Wedbush Noble Cooke Inc., 841 F.2d 282 (9th Cir. 1988); Adrian v.
Smith Barney, Harris, Upham & Company, Inc., 841 F.2d 1059 (11th Cir. 1988); Villa Garcia
v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 833 F.2d 545 (5th Cir. 1987).
151. 690 F. Supp. 144 (E.D.N.Y. 1988).
152. Gugliotta v. Evans & Co., Inc., 690 F. Supp. 144, 146 (E.D.N.Y. 1988).
153. Id. (citing Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16 n.11 (1983)).
154. Id.
155. Id. at 147. Id.
156. Ketchum v. Prudential-Bache Securities, 685 F. Supp. 786 (D. Kan. 1988).
157. Id.
158. Id. at 795.
159. Leicht v. Batenlan Eichler, Hill, Richards, Inc., 848 F.2d 130 (9th Cir. 1988);
Ahrberg v. Colton, [1988-89 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 93,910, at 90,066
(W.D. Okla. 1988); Brick v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 675 F. Supp. 1251 (D.D.C. 1987).
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tration of any claim for which a ". . . remedy may exist pursuant to any
expressed or implied right of action under the federal securities laws. . . .'"1
The court refused to conclude that the language in the customer agreement
had been included simply to give the notice required by Rule 15[c]2-2.16,
Similarly, in Leicht v. Bateman Eichler, Hill, Richards, Inc. 62 the Ninth
Circuit found that the language of the arbitration provision gave the
customer ". . . the option to resolve his federal securities disputes through
litigation rather than arbitration" and "[a]bsent any evidence that the parties
intended otherwise, we should uphold the ordinary meaning of language in
a contract." 63
Choice of Arbitration Forum. In Roney & Co. v. Goren'64 the Sixth
Circuit affirmed an order of the district court staying arbitration of a
customer's fraud claim pending before the NASD and compelling arbitration
of her claims before the NYSE pursuant to an arbitration clause in an
executed customer agreement. 6 5 The clause provided that any dispute must
be arbitrated solely under NYSE rules. The court rejected contentions that
the clause violated both the anti-waiver provision of the Exchange Act and
the NASD's requirements that a member arbitrate before the NASD upon
demand of the customer. 66 The court also rejected the SEC's views expressed
in an amicus curiae brief that the contract provision was not enforceable
because it "attempts to override the SRO (NASD) rules that govern broker-
dealers and their associated persons, and because enforcement of the pro-
vision would undermine customer protections of the SRO arbitration sys-
tem."167 The SEC argued that allowing the customer to select "the most
efficient and economical arbitration forum"' 68 effectuates an important
underlying policy of the SRO arbitration system.
The Sixth Circuit concluded that limiting the arbitration forum available
to a customer did not constitute a waiver of a substantive obligation of the
Exchange Act' 69 and that the enforcement of the customer agreement "up-
holds the Federal Arbitration Act's specific purpose of 'reversing centuries
of judicial hostility to arbitration agreements . . . [by] plac[ing] arbitration
agreements upon the same footing as other contracts.""' 70 Addressing a
customer's right, pursuant to SRO rules, to select a particular arbitration
forum, the Sixth Circuit observed that "the customer is equally free to
160. Brick, 675 F. Supp. at 1254.
161. Id.
162. 848 F.2d 130 (9th Cir. 1988).
163. Leicht v. Bateman Eichler, Hill, Richards, Inc., 848 F.2d 130, 133 (9th Cir. 1988).
164. 875 F.2d 1218 (6th Cir. 1989).
165. Roney & Co. v. Goren, 875 F.2d 1218, 1219 (6th Cir. 1989).
166. Id.
167. See Brief for the Securities Exchange Commission as Amicus Curiae at 4, Roney &
Co. v. Goren, 875 F.2d 1218 (6th Cir. 1989).
168. Id. at 16.
169. Roney & Co., 875 F.2d at 1220.
170. Id. at 1221 (quoting Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 510-511 (1974)
(quoting H.R. Rep. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 2 (1924)).
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agree to limit his recourse to a particular forum," 17' and emphasized that
"[tihis decision upholds federal policy favoring arbitration without doing
significant injury to customer freedom of choice or the protections of the
Exchange Act.'
' 72
In a release following the Sixth Circuit's decision in Goren, Daniel
Goelzer, the General Counsel of the SEC, expressed the SEC's view that
the decision's significance is limited by recently approved SRO rule changes
173
which provide that "[1bo agreement shall include any condition which limits
or contradicts the rules of any self-regulatory organization or limits the
ability of a party to file any claim in arbitration or limits the ability of the
arbitrators to make any award."' 174 Thus, a member of the SROs would
not be permitted to limit customers to a particular arbitration forum if it
would be in derogation of a rule of a SRO of which it is a member. 175
E. Arbitration Awards
1. Punitive Damages.
The perception that punitive damages are rarely, if ever, awarded by
arbitrators is one of the elements fueling the current controversy raging
over the securities industry's use of predispute arbitration agreements.'
76 It
appears, however, that this perception, even if previously correct, may have
to be altered because the award of such damages may become more
commonplace in arbitration.
First, federal and state arbitration statutes do not expressly prohibit
arbitrators from hearing claims for punitive damages. 7 7 Second, arbitrators
are not prohibited by the rules of the securities self-regulatory organizations
("SROs") from hearing claims for punitive damages or awarding punitive
damages. In fact, Edward Morris, Arbitration Director of the New York
Stock Exchange (NYSE), recently remarked at the New York Institute of
Finance Conference that he has informed NYSE's arbitrators to award
punitive damages if punitive damages are appropriate. 78 Similarly, the new
171. Id. at 1221.
172. Id.
173. SEC Litigation Release No. 12,198 (Aug. 7, 1989) (available from Wash. & Lee L.
Rev.).
174. New York Stock Exchange Rule 637; National Association of Securities Dealers
Rules of Fair Practice § 21; American Stock Exchange Rule 427; Securities Exchange Act
Release No. 26,805, [Current] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,414, at 80,099 (May 10, 1989);
Chicago Board of Options Exchange rule 18.35; Securities Exchange Act Release No. 27,093
(Aug. 2, 1989). The Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board, the Pacific Stock Exchange, and
the Midwest Stock Exchange also have submitted proposed rule changes to the SEC that would
add an identical provision to their respective arbitration rules. SEC File No. SR-MSRB-88-5;
SR-PSE-88-7; SR-MSE-88-11.
175. 175 SEC Litigation Release No. 12,198 (Aug. 7, 1989).
176. Morris, Punitive Damages in Securities Arbitration, 21 REv. SEC. & COMM. REG.
167 (1988) [hereinafter Morris].
177. Id.
178. Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 3, at 100-02 (Jan. 22, 1988).
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arbitration rules of the American Arbitration Association("AAA"), an
organization which regularly sponsors securities arbitration, do not specifi-
cally address the issue of an arbitrator's authority to award such damages.
79
Rather, arbitrators at the AAA as well as those of the National Association
of Securities Dealers (NASD) have requested briefs from the parties to the
arbitration when the issue of arbitrator authority to award the parties to
the arbitration when the issue of arbitrator authority to award such damages
arises.8 0
Finally, an emerging trend in recent case law points to the increased
availability of punitive damages in arbitration. While it is clear that punitive
damages are not available for violations of the Exchange Act, s'8 Garrity v.
Lyle Stuart, Inc. s2 has been cited frequently as authority for decisions
holding that an arbitrator is prohibited from including punitive damages in
an award for common-law or state statutory claims. The New York Court
of Appeals, when explaining this result, stated that not only did the
arbitrator not have the authority to make such an award, but an award
which imposes punitive damages even though agreed upon by the parties,
was violative of public policy and, thus, could be vacated.
Arrayed in opposition to the Garrity decision, however, is a line of
cases which ultimately have found that an arbitrator may award punitive
damages in a matter governed by the Federal Arbitration Act unless a
federal policy exists prohibiting an award of such damages or some express
contractual limitations on the arbitrator's authority to award punitive dam-
ages." 3 Parties, of course, are free to exclude from arbitration consideration
of punitive damages or RICO treble damages in their arbitration agreements.
However, such claims then could be pursued in judicial forums.
The award of RICO damages by arbitrators also should not be open
to question. As noted earlier, the McMahon court ruled that claims arising
under RICO are arbitrable. It, therefore, would seem that if RICO claims
are not excluded from arbitration agreements, consideration of such damages
should be permitted whether RICO damages are considered remedial or
punitive in nature because RICO provides a federal cause of action and is
not to be governed by state law.1
8 4
179. Morris, supra note 164, at 168.
180. Id.
181. See Globus v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 418 F.2d 1276 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
397 U.S. 913 (1970); Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395
U.S. 977 (1969).
182. 386 N.Y.S.2d 831 (1976). See also Tinaway v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc., 692 F. Supp. 220, 226 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (citing In re Energy Systems Equip.
Leasing Securities Litig., 642 F. Supp. 718, 744 (E.D.N.Y. 1986)).
183. See Bonar v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 835 F.2d 1378 (lth Cir. 1988); Raytheon
Company v. Automated Business Systems, No. 89-0895 (D. Mass. Dec. 6, 1988); Duggal
International Inc. v. Sall Mettal, B.V., No. 84 C.V. 7170 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); Willoughby Roofing
& Supply Co. v. Kajima Intern., 598 F. Supp. 353 (1984); Willis v. Shearson/American Express
Co., 569 F. Supp. 821 (M.D.N.O. 1983).
184. Faircloth v. Jackie Fine Arts, Inc., [1987-88 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 93,781, at 98,677-78 (D.S.C. Mar. 30, 1988).
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2. Judicial Review of Awards: In General
An arbitration award is presumed to be valids- and the scope of judicial
review is narrow. 8 6 It may be modified or vacated by a court on very
limited grounds. 87 Section 10 of the Arbitration Act provides that awards
may be set aside where:
a) the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means;
b) there is evidence of partiality or corruption on the part of the
arbitrators or either of them;
c) the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone
the hearing upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear
evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any
misbehavior by which the rights of any party may have been
prejudiced; or
d) the arbitrators exceeded their powers or imperfectly executed
them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject
matter was not made.
88
In addition to the statutory provisions, a non-statutory ground for vacatur
of an arbitration award was noted by the Supreme Court in Wilko, for
example, if the arbitrator's decision was rendered in "manifest disregard of
the law."'8 9
3. Judicial Review: Decisions
The Second Circuit has warned that ". . . [olverly technical judicial
review of arbitration awards would frustrate the basic purposes of arbitra-
tion: to resolve disputes speedily and to avoid the expense in delay of
extended court proceedings."'190 However, it is also clear that ". . . [f]or
judicial review to be meaningful, an arbitration award cannot be absolutely
immune from scrutiny."' 9' As one court observed, "[w]hile arbitration
awards generally receive deferential review by the courts, deference is not
185. Ouziel v. Shearson Lehman Brothers, Inc., No. 86-CV-1822, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
3037 *4 (E.D.N.Y. 1988) (citing Gunther v. San Diego & Arizona Eastern Railway Co., 382
U.S. 257 (1965)); Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America, 350 U.S. 198 (1956); Wilko v.
Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953); Burchell v. Marsh, 58 U.S. 540 (1854).
186. Synergy Gas Co. v. Sasso, 853 F.2d 59 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 559 (1988).
187. Sargent v. Paine Webber, Jackson & Curtis, 674 F. Supp. 920, 922 (D.D.C. 1987).
188. 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1970). A notice of motion to vacate, modify or correct an award
must be served within three months after the award is filed or delivered. 9 U.S.C. § 12 (1970).
In this connection, see O.R. Securities, Inc. v. Professional Planning Assoc., Inc., 857 F.2d
742 (1lth Cir. 1988) (holding that proper manner for challenging arbitration award is in form
of motion as provided in Fed. R. Civ. P. 7(b)).
189. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436-37 (1953).
190. Federal Commerce & Nay. Co. v. Kanematsu-Gosho, Ltd., 457 F.2d 387, 389 (2d
Cir. 1972).
191. Sargent, 674 F. Supp. at 924 (citing Siegel v. Titan Indus. Corp., 779 F.2d 891, 894
(2d Cir. 1985)).
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abdication."' 192 Against this framework, courts have conducted reviews of
the following issues.
Evidentiary Issues. The courts generally have held that arbitrators are
permitted to determine the materiality and relevance of any evidence that
is proffered, are not bound by any formal rules governing the admission
of evidence, and the failure to follow evidentiary rules is not a grounds of
vacatur. 93
Clarification of Arbitration Awards. The lack of specificity in arbitra-
tors' rulings and the resultant effect on a court's ability to review an award
has resulted in vacatur and remand to the arbitration panel for a full
explanation of the method by which damages were computed. One court
has explained:
[I]t is entirely appropriate for a district court to direct arbitrators
to explain their awards. This method avoids any judicial guessing
as to the rationale behind the award. Remands do not constitute
judicial invasion of the arbitrators province but rather serve to give
the parties what they bargained for-a clear decision from the
arbitrators. 1
9 4
In Tinaway v. Merrill Lynch & Company, Inc., the court initially
granted the plaintiff's motion to vacate the award on the grounds of
"evident partiality" toward the defendant and retained jurisdiction over the
matter.'95 The court could not find in the arbitrators' decision a ground
from which the amount of the award could be inferred and, thus, inferred
partiality toward the defendant on the basis of the arbitrators awarding
only five percent of the amount allegedly lost. In a subsequent decision,
however, the Tinaway court reversed its earlier holding in light of McMahon,
stating that its prior conclusion that personal bias could be shown by means
other than pecuniary interest or some actual relationship between the parties
in cases alleging federal securities violations was no longer valid. 96 The
court also concluded that an examination of the record did not support a
determination that the arbitrators acted with manifest disregard for the law.
The SEC, of course, has no authority to dictate the scope of judicial
review of arbitration decisions. However, the SEC has recommended to the
Securities Industry Conference on Arbitration ("SICA") that its Uniform
Code be amended ". . . to provide for sufficient records for appellate courts
to use for their review using the developing 'manifest disregard standard."' ' 197
192. Id. at 923.
193. See Swink & Co. v. Norris & Hirschberg, Inc., 845 F.2d 789 (8th Cir. 1988); Ouziel
v. Shearson Lehman Bros., Inc., 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3037 (E.D.N.Y. 1988).
194. Sargent, 674 F. Supp. at 924.
195. Tinaway v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 658 F. Supp. 576 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
196. Tinaway v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 692 F. Supp. 220 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
197. See Letter from Director of the SEC's Division of Market Regulation to members
of SICA (Sept. 10, 1987) (transmitting staff recommendations which had been endorsed by
the SEC staff) (available from Wash. & Lee L. Rev.).
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The SEC also has made significant recommendations that, in operation,
would provide courts with many more specifics about the nature of awards
and the specific issues upon which arbitrators rule.195 These recommenda-
tions, if implemented, would impact on the consideration given to arbitra-
tors' decisions in later proceedings involving the same issues.
Awards Rendered in "Manifest Disregard of the Law." The Supreme
Court in Wilko v. Swan opined in dictum that the arbitrators' "manifest
disregard of the law" in rendering an award could constitute a nonstatutory
ground for vacating an arbitration award. 199 The Wilko court, however, did
not set forth the factors that would establish "manifest disregard of the
law." In fact, one court has mused ". . . [t]hat elusive, non-statutory
ground for vacating an arbitration award is just as often described in terms
of what it is not as what it is."200 In Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith
v. Bobker the Second Circuit provided a very limited test for vacatur on
that basis:
. . [allthough the bounds of this ground have never been defined,
it clearly means more than error or misunderstanding with respect
to the law. The error must have been obvious and capable of being
readily and instantly perceived by the average person qualified to
serve as an arbitrator. Moreover, the term 'disregard' implies that
the arbitrator appreciates the existence of a clearly governing legal
principle but decides to ignore or pay no attention to it. To adopt
a less strict standard of judicial review would be to undermine our
well established deference to arbitration as a favored method of
settling disputes when agreed to by the parties. Judicial inquiry
under the 'manifest disregard' standard is therefore extremely lim-
ited. The governing law alleged to have been ignored by the arbi-
trators must be well defined, explicit, and clearly applicable. We
are not at liberty to set aside an arbitration panel's award because
of an arguable difference regarding the meaning or applicability of
laws urged upon it.201
Confirmation of Awards. Section 9 of the Arbitration Act provides for
confirmation of an award in a court if so provided by the parties in the
198. Id.
199. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436-37 (1953).
200. DeAngelis v. Shumway, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8927 *6 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
201. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Bobker, Inc., 808 F.2d 930, 933-34 (2d
Cir. 1986).
Other cases interpreting the concept include Swink & Company, Inc. v. Norris & Hirsch-
berg, Inc., 845 F.2d 789 (8th Cir. 1988); French v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc., 784 F.2d 902 (9th Cir. 1986); Siegal v. Titan Indus. Corp., 779 F.2d 891 (2d Cir. 1985);
A/S Sijestad v. Hideca Trading, Inc., 678 F.2d 391 (2d Cir. 1982); Kurt Orban Co. v. Angeles
Metal Systems, 573 F.2d 739 (2d Cir. 1978); DeAngelis v..Shumway, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
8927 (S.D.N.Y.); Svoboda v. Negey Assoc., 655 F. Supp. 1329 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); Maidman v.
O'Brien, 473 F. Supp. 25 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:583
agreement to arbitrate. 20 2 In a recent decision, a federal district court which
had ordered the proceedings in a lawsuit stayed and compelled arbitration
held that courts retain jurisdiction to affirm a binding award which had
been entered in another district.
20 3
Enforcement of Awards Against Brokers. Customers have the support
of the SROs in enforcing securities arbitration awards because if the broker-
dealer does not pay an award promptly, the SRO can impose sanctions.
The threat of sanctions against a securities firm generally makes it unnec-
essary for the customer to confirm the arbitration award in court or to
seek judicial remedies in order to receive payment.
F. The Preclusive Effect of Arbitration Awards
The preclusive effect of awards has become an important and hotly
debated issue with the prospect of continued, bifurcated proceedings in class
actions arising under the Exchange Act, where some members have not
signed arbitration clauses. Generally, courts have been unwilling to give
arbitration awards preclusive effect. For example, a recent New York court
has stated:
Although some arbitration proceedings have been given preclusive
effect, the Supreme Court has ... been unwilling to hold that
arbitration proceedings are always entitled to res judicata or collat-
eral estoppel effect .... [T]he Supreme court cautioned that, in
fashioning the preclusion rules for arbitration proceedings, the
nature of the federal rights and the protection afforded them in an
arbitration must be considered. 2°4
The terms collateral estoppel and res judicata often are used inter-
changeably. Each doctrine, however, produces a different preclusive effect.
Under the doctrine of res judicata (claim preclusion), "a final judgment on
the matter of an action precludes the parties or their privies from relitigating
issues that were or could have been raised in that action." 205 Further, "res
judicata applies to claims for or defenses to recovery that were available at
202. Section 9 of the Arbitration Act provides:
If the parties in their agreement have agreed that a judgment of the court shall
be entered upon the award made pursuant to the arbitration, and shall specify the
court, then at any time within one year after the award is made any party to the
arbitration may apply to the court so specified for an order confirming the award,
and thereupon the court must grant an order unless the award is vacated, modified,
or corrected....
9 U.S.C. § 9 (1970).
203. Wing v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 678 F. Supp. 622 (N.D. Miss. 1987) (citing NII Metal
Serv., Inc. v. ICM Steel Corp., 514 F. Supp. 164 (N.D. Ill. 1982)); Smiga v. Dean Witter
Reynolds, Inc., 766 F.2d 698 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1067 (1986).
204. Cullen v. Paine Webber Group, 689 F. Supp. 269, 276 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (citing
McDonald v. City of West Branch, 466 U.S. 284 (1984) and Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v.
Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 (1985)).
205. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980).
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the time of the earlier litigation, even if they were not raised or determined
in that proceeding." 206 The elements of res judicata include identity of
parties, an identity of the cause of action, and a full and fair opportunity




On the other hand, collateral estoppel (issue preclusion) will be applied
to estop a party from relitigating issues which were decided in an earlier
proceeding. Before the doctrine -will be applied, the following general
prerequisites must be met:
a) identity of issues;
b) actual litigation of the issue in a prior litigation proceeding;
c) the determination of the issue in the prior litigation or pro-
ceeding must have been a critical and necessary part of the
judgment in the earlier proceedings; and
d) the party against whom the earlier decision is asserted, must
have had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the
earlier proceedings.
208
Accordingly, res judicata differs from collateral estoppel because res judicata
bars only the relitigation of identical claims between the same parties or
their privies. Collateral estoppel, however, bars the relitigation by a party
to a prior litigation only of a previously decided issue. While some courts
have given preclusive effect to arbitration awards in subsequent court
proceedings even where the underlying claim involves the federal securities
laws,209 others have refused because the nature of the award is unclear.
21 0
206. Cullen, 689 F. Supp. at 276 (citing Brown v. Felsen, 472 U.S. 127, 131 (1979)).
207. Id. at 278 (citing Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. 110, 1130 (1983) and Montana
v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153-54 (1979)).
208. Artman v. Prudential-Bache Securities, Inc., 670 F. Supp. 769, 773 (S.D. Ohio 1987).
209. See Greenblatt v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., 763 F.2d 1352 (l1th Cir. 1985)
(in context of bifurcated proceeding, court estopped customer from relitigating issues decided
in arbitration proceeding that were necessary for plaintiff to prove predicate acts to establish
RICO claim); Ryan v. Liss, Tenner & Goldberg Securities Corp., 683 F. Supp. 480 (D.N.J.
1988) (because issues already had been determined in state forum, investors were precluded by
doctrine of collateral estoppel from relitigating in federal court validity and applicability of
arbitration agreement); Hammerman v. Peacock, 654 F. Supp. 71 (D.D.C. 1987) (court found
that arbitration panel, in deciding customer's state claims, effectively resolved identical factual
issues underlying customer's section 10(b) claims against firm and account executive handling
account, and it, therefore, was appropriate to give collateral estoppel effect to arbitrators'
decision). See also Cullen v. Paine Webber Group, Inc., 689 F. Supp. 269 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
210. See Blunt Ellis & Loewi, Inc. v. Giles, 845 F.2d 131 (7th Cir. 1988); Hybert v.
Shearson Lehman/American Express Co., Inc., (N.D. Ill. 1988). See also Artiman v. Prudential-
Bache Securities Inc., 670 F. Spp. 769 (S.D. Ohio 1987) (because arbitration award gave no
information under which court could determine whether underlying federal securities claims
actually were litigated in arbitration proceeding, decision could not be given preclusive'effect);
O'Neill v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 654 F. Supp. 347 (N.D. Ill. 1987)
(court was unwilling to estop plaintiff from relitigating issues previously submitted to arbitrators
because court could not determine what in fact was decided by arbitrator); Wing v. J.C.
Bradford & Co., Inc., 678 F. Supp. 622 (N.D. Miss. 1987) (because arbitration decision did
not elaborate on findings, decision could not have collateral estoppel effect).
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PART II
RECENT REGULATORY AND LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
A. Arbitration Reform Efforts of the SEC and the Securities Industry
1. SEC Initiative
The McMahon Court was influenced strongly by the SEC's pro-arbitra-
tion amicus curiae brief2 '" which emphasized the SEC's ". . . sweeping
authority over the rules adopted by SROs relating to arbitration of customer
disputes, including the power to mandate the adoption of any additional
rules it deems necessary to ensure the adequacy of an SRO's arbitration
system." 212 Following McMahon, the expectation of a greater volume of
SRO-sponsored arbitrations and the perception of a need for improvements
in the process (based on an eighteen month review of securities industry
sponsored arbitration) led the SEC's Division of Market Regulation, with
SEC approval, to issue to SICA a series of recommendations which would
"enhance not only the actual fairness of the proceedings, but the public's
perception of their fairness.
'21 3
2. SICA Response and Reform Activity.
Pursuant to the SEC's request, SICA, on December 14, 1987, issued a
response to the SEC's recommendations. 2 4 While expressing agreement with
211. Shearson/American Express Co. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 223 (1987).
212. Brief for SEC as Amicus Curiae at 16, Shearson/American Express Co. v. McMahon,
482 U.S. 220 (1987).
213. Letter from Richard G. Ketchum, Director of Division of Market Regulation of
SEC, to members of the Securities Industry Conference on Arbitration ("SICA") (Sept. 10,
1987) (available from Wash. & Lee L. Rev.). SICA consists of representatives of the securities
self-regulatory organizations ("SROs") and the public. In the letter, the SEC recommended
that:
1. Lawyers, accountants and others who regularly provide services to the securities
industry be disqualified as public arbitrators;
2. Improvements be made in arbitrator training and evaluation of the performance
of arbitrators;
3. Investigations by the SROs and disclosure of the background of arbitrators in
advance of hearings be broadened to permit the parties to exercise their peremptory
and for cause challenges to the arbitrators;
4. SROs should do more to preserve an adequate record for courts to use when
they review arbitral awards;
5. Summary disclosures be required of the amount of and the legal reasoning
supporting the rulings on damages clainied as well as those actually awarded, the
names of the arbitrators, and whether each concurred with or dissented from the
award; and
6. SROs need to expand existing procedures in order to provide both for the
resolution of discovery disputes by either the chairman or full panel prior to the
hearing, and for prehearing conferences and preliminary hearings for cases that are
sufficiently complex to warrant such procedures.
Id.
214. Letter from SICA to Richard G. Ketchum, Director of the Division of Market
Regulation of SEC (Dec. 14, 1987) (available from Wash. & Lee L. Rev.).
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many of the SEC's suggestions, 2 5 SICA questioned the wisdom of several
key recommendations.
In the months following its initial response, SICA engaged in extensive
reform activity directed toward addressing the major concerns raised by the
SEC. As a result of this activity, several sections of th6 Uniform Code of
Arbitration (the "Code") were revised. The SROs largely adopted those
revisions and submitted the proposed rule changes to the SEC. On May 16,
1989, the SEC approved the proposed rule changes submitted by the New
York Stock Exchange, the National Association of Securities Dealers, and
the American Stock Exchange. 21 As discussed below, among the primary
areas targeted for reform are the selection, classification and disclosures
required of arbitrators; evaluation of arbitrators; unavailability of arbitra-
tors; the publication of arbitration awards; rehearing conferences and dis-
covery issues; the handling of complex cases; and the content and disclosure
of arbitration clauses in customer agreements.
Classification and Disclosures of Arbitrators. In an effort to ensure
that the public as well as the SEC regards SRO-sponsored arbitration as a
fair and impartial forum, SICA has adopted revisions in the Code sections
that address the selection, classification and disclosures required of arbitra-
tors who serve on panels.
Classification of Arbitrators. Section 8(a)(1) of the Code provides that
a majority of the nonintra-industry panels will be "public" arbitrators,
unless the public customer requests otherwise. In response to the SEC's
concerns relating to the "absence of clear guidelines for qualifying public
arbitrators ... and the inclusion in the pool of public arbitrators of persons
with clear affiliations with the securities industry, 217 SICA has developed
criteria set forth in amended Code Section 8(a)(2) that delineate whether an
arbitrator will be "deemed as being from the securities industry. ' 218 At
least one SRO, the New York Stock Exchange, has formulated even stricter
guidelines for the classification of arbitrators. 219
Disclosures Required of Arbitrators. The SEC, in its September 1987
letter, recommended that section 11 of the Code be amended to provide
specific guidelines relating to the scope of disclosures required of arbitra-
215. Id.
216. 54 Fed. Reg. 21144 (1989).
217. Letter to SICA, supra note 213, at 2.
218. Pursuant to the Uniform Code of Arbitration ("U.C.A."), § 8(a)(2)(1988), an
arbitrator will be deemed as being from the securities industry if he or she:
1. is a person associated with a member, or broker-dealer, government securities
broker, government securities dealer or registered investment adviser, or
2. has been associated with any of the above within the past three (3) years, or
3. is retired from any of the above, or
4. is an attorney, accountant or other professional who devoted twenty (20) percent
or more of his or her professional work effort to securities industry clients within
the last two years.
219. See NYSE, Guidelines for the Classification of Arbitrators, in BROKER DEALER
INsTnTuTE 772 (1988) (Practicing Law Institute).
WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:583
tors. 220 In response, SICA in June 1988 amended section 11 to impose upon
an arbitrator a continuing duty to disclose any direct or indirect financial
or personal interest in the outcome of the arbitration as well as any existing
or past financial, business, professional, family or social relationship which
are likely to affect impartiality or which might reasonably create an ap-
pearance of partiality or bias.
22'
Disciplinary History of Arbitrators. Regular checks on the disciplinary
record of arbitrators are considered by the SEC to be of great importance. 222
SICA also advocates close scrutiny of arbitrators' backgrounds and a review
of the disciplinary history of all present and newly enrolled arbitrators. The
arbitrator profile of some of the SROs, for example, the New York Stock
Exchange, has been amended to include questions about the arbitrator's
disciplinary history.
223
Notice of Selection of Arbitrators. In the past section 9 of the Code
provided that the names and business affiliations of the arbitrators be
submitted to the parties at least eight business days prior to the date of the
initial hearing session. 224 SICA revised section 9 in June 1988 to further
provide that employment histories for the past ten years of each arbitrator
assigned to the case as well as the information disclosed pursuant to section
11 also be made available. 225 A party is permitted to make further inquiries
to the Director of Arbitration concerning the background of any arbitra-
tor.
226
Unavailability of Arbitrators. Sections 9 and 12 of the revised Code
address the unavailability of arbitrators due to physical disability, death, or
any other reason. 227 In the event an arbitrator becomes unable to serve prior
to the first hearing session, the new section 9 requires the Director of
Arbitration to fill any vacancy on the panel. 221 If the vacancy occurs after
the first hearing session, new section 12 permits the remaining arbitrators
to continue the hearing unless a party objects to such continuation within
five days of notification of the vacancy. 229 The Director of Arbitration,
upon the party's objection, must appoint a new panel member to fill the
vacancyy 0 Prior to this revision, a vacancy resulted in a de novo hearing
unless both parties consented to a continuation of the matter with the
remaining arbitrators .231
220. Letter to SICA from SEC, supra note 213, at 5-6.
221. U.C.A. § 11(a)(1), (a)(2) and (c) (1988).
222. Letter to SICA from SEC, supra note 213, at 3.
223. See NYSE, Arbitrator Profile, supra note 219, at 773-74.
224. See U.C.A. § 9 (1978).
225. See U.C.A. § 9 (1988).
226. Id.
227. See U.C.A. §§ 9, 12 (1988).
228. Id. at § 9.
229. Id. at § 12.
230. Id.
231. See U.C.A. § 12 (1978).
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Evaluating Arbitrators. Currently, arbitrators are evaluated by SRO
staff and other arbitrators, and SROs are expected to investigate any
complaint received concerning an arbitration . 2 2 In a September 1987 letter
to SICA, the SEC recommended a reform of the arbitrator evaluation
procedures and proposed the development of a written evaluation system.2
3
Questionnaires "seeking evaluations of arbitrator competence, preparedness,
and fairness," completed by parties, their counsel, and other arbitrators,
would constitute the basis of the system.
23 4
SICA initially disputed the SEC's call for reform of current procedures
and stated its concern that further evaluation would discourage qualified
individuals from serving.2?5 SICA also questioned whether results received
from post-arbitration reports would not be skewed because all parties would
not necessarily fill out the questionnaires. 236 As part of its reform efforts,
however, SICA has selected the arbitrator evaluation program of the Chicago
Board of Options Exchange as a pilot for the industry. The SICA evaluation
program consists of a questionnaire seeking the reaction of parties to the
entire process.
Prehearing Conferences and Discovery Issues. Upon review of SRO
procedures for prehearing discovery, the SEC perceived a need for the
development of additional procedures which would formally "provide both
for the resolution of discovery disputes by either the chairman or full panel
prior to the hearing and for prehearing conferences and preliminary hearings




Acknowledging the insufficiency of existing procedures, provisions which
will facilitate the exchange of documents and information between parties
prior to the arbitration proceeding were approved by SICA members in
June 19 8 8.
238 Under section 20 of the revised Code, a,"party may serve a
written request for information or documents upon another party twenty
(20) business days or more after service of the Statement of Claim by the
Director of Arbitration, or upon filing of the Answer, whichever is earlier."
Requests for information must be satisfied or objected to within thirty (30)
calendar days from the date of service unless the requesting party grants
an extension. Any response to objections must be served on all parties and
filed with the Director of Arbitration within ten (10) calendar days of receipt
of the objection (if the party's information request is unsatisfied, then upon
the written request of the party, the dispute will be referred by the Director
of Arbitration to either a prehearing conference or a selected arbitrator).
All parties are to serve on each other copies of documents in their possession
and to identify the witnesses that they intend to present at the hearing.
232. Letter to SEC from SICA, supra note 214, at 4.
233. Letter to SICA from SEC, supra note 213, at 5.
234. Id.
235. Letter to SEC from SICA, supra note 214, at 4.
236. Id.
237. Letter to SICA from SEC, supra note 213, at 9.
238. See U.C.A. § 20 (1988).
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Failure to do so will result in the exclusion from the arbitration of such
documents or witnesses. However, documents or identification of witnesses
intended for use at cross-examination or rebuttal are not required to be
served. Section 20 of the Code also provides for more formalized procedures
for prehearing discovery conferences. A prehearing discovery conference
may be called at the request of either party in the arbitration or at the
discretion of an arbitrator or the SRO's Director of Arbitratioi.239
Publication of Arbitrators' A wards and Need for Written Opinions. In
connection with the publication of arbitrators' decisions, SICA member
organizations and the American Arbitration Association historically have
not provided written statements explaining the basis of a decision. The SEC,
however, has urged the sponsors of arbitration proceedings to summarize
and make public the results of such proceedings.340
In SICA's initial response to the SEC's recommendations, SICA chal-
lenged the need for a written opinion in every arbitration matter and stated
that such a requirement would hinder rather than enhance the arbitration
process. SICA expressed the belief that such a requirement "will serve little
utility and may mislead parties regarding an arbitrator's track record.'
'
24
SICA, nonetheless, suggested that a list of cases detailing the general subject
matter of each case, the amount of the claim and award, and the names
of the arbitrators be maintained. The names of the parties would be deleted,
but dismissals on jurisdictional grounds would be noted. SICA did not
favor public availability of such a list and argued that only parties and
their counsel to pending cases should have access to the list. SICA also did
not support retroactive application of the proposed change.
2
On July 28, 1988, Section 29 of the Code was amended by adding two
new paragraphs, 29(e) and 29(f). The amendments not only incorporated
the provisions of the initial SICA proposal, but enlarged the scope of the
material to be disclosed.243
3. Arbitrability of Class Actions and Other Complex Claims.
The SEC concluded upon its review of SRO arbitration procedures that
"special guidelines for the administration of large and complex cases are
needed.' ' 4 In July 1988, this view was reiterated by SEC Chairman David
Ruder in testimony before a House subcommittee conducting hearings on
proposed arbitration-related legislation in which Ruder responded to ques-
tions related to the adequacy of arbitration as a forum for class actions
and other complex actions. Concern was expressed during the hearing that
the rights of parties who had signed a mandatory predispute agreement
239. See U.C.A. § 20(b)(4) (1988).
240. Letter to SICA from SEC, supra note 213, at 8.
241. Letter to SEC from SICA, supra note 214, at 6.
242. Id.
243. See U.C.A. §§ 29(e), (f) (1988).
244. Letter to SICA from SEC, supra note 213, at 12.
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would be abridged if arbitration of complex matters were required. In
response, Ruder suggested that the securities industry should develop rules
that would allow investors who had signed predispute arbitration agreements
access to the courts where complex claims are involved.
Currently, sections 1 and 5 of the Code permit arbitrators and SROs
to exercise discretion in this area. Section 1 allows SROs to decline juris-
diction over a matter, while section 5 permits arbitrators, acting in their
own discretion, to dismiss proceedings and "refer the parties to remedies
provided by law. '24 In response to Ruder's comments, SICA is studying
the issue and has requested input from the ABA's Committee on SRO
Relations and the ABA Task Force on Securities Arbitration. Views received
to date as to the advisability of rule changes which would permit access to
the courts in certain circumstances belie a lack of consensus on the most
appropriate action to take.
A threshold question to be resolved is whether complex claims should
be heard by arbitrators at all. However, the trend is for courts to find
arbitration panels capable of resolving complex disputes. 2A6 The development
of adequate administrative procedures to handle complex matters such as
prehearing conferences would aid the disposition of complex matters, but
whether such procedures would undermine the very nature of arbitration
must be considered.
If arbitrators are to decline to hear "complex" claims and refer such
claims to the courts, the SROs must provide some guidance to the parties
and the arbitrators and not rely on the discretion of a particular panel. The
types of cases that perhaps should be remitted include: class actions, where
all members of the class have not agreed to arbitrate; claims that also
include claims against third parties who have not signed predispute arbitra-
tion agreements; and cases (including class actions) that require extensive
discovery from third parties (including issuers) in order to render substantial
justice.
Of greatest concern to those considering this issue are class actions,
where it is often found that many, but not all of the claimants and
defendants may be a party to an arbitration agreement. In those situations,
a bifurcated proceeding will result, permitting some parties to conduct
extensive discovery and litigate their claims in court, while other parties will
be compelled to arbitrate without the benefit of those same procedures.
Enforcing arbitration in such situations will require certification of separate
classes-those subject to arbitration and those not-which have essentially
the same claims. The exclusion of class actions per se from arbitration,
however, is not appropriate because some class actions may involve intra-
industry parties, all of which either would be subject to an agreement and
would be required by the rules of the SRO to arbitrate or the nature of
the claim would not require discovery from third parties.
245. See U.C.A. §§ 1, 5 (1980).
246. Kronfeld v. Advest, Inc., 675 F. Supp. 1449, 1452-1453 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
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A compromise position which the securities industry should consider
and which may be satisfactory to the SEC and Congress would prohibit a
broker from declining to open a cash account if the customer refused to
sign an arbitration agreement. Because many class actions involve claims
relating to syndicated new offerings, such offerings may not be transacted
through a margin account because credit cannot be extended to new offerings
by syndicate members pursuant to section 1 1(d) of the Exchange Act. This
would exempt most complex class actions that require discovery from third
parties from mandatory arbitration.
There is always the possibility that difficulties will arise if rigid criteria
for remittance are developed and, therefore, the effort should be directed
at providing arbitrators with a list of considerations that should be reviewed
prior to making a decision to decline jurisdiction. Another suggested alter-
native envisions a system that would rely upon the recommendations of a
litigation counsel retained by the SRO. The expert would review cases and
then suggest to the arbitrators which cases should be remitted.
B. Legislative Proposals.
Because the practice of requiring customers to agree to the arbitration
of future disputes as a condition of doing business with a broker-dealer is
perceived in some quarters as "anti-consumer," a nonpartisan call for
legislative reform was heard in the 100th Congress. Consequently, legislation
cosponsored by Representatives Rick Boucher (D-Va.), John D. Dingell (D-
Mich.), Chairman of the Energy and Commerce Committee, and Edward
J. Markey (D-Mass.), Chairman of the Telecommunications and Finance
Subcommittee, was introduced on June 30, 1988.
The bill, House Resolution 4960, would have amended section 15(c) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and "provide[d] for the fair, equitable,
and voluntary arbitration of customer-broker disputes."2 7 To be known as
the "Securities Arbitration Reform Act of 1988," the bill, at the outset,
would have prohibited the use of predispute arbitration agreements between
the customer and broker-dealer unless such agreement was entered into by
the customer on a voluntary and informed basis.2 8 Furthermore, the SEC
would be required to promulgate rules to enforce that requirement. The
SEC rules, at a minimum, would have had to require a separate signature
page for arbitration agreements, forbid the assessment of an additional fee
upon those customers who choose not to sign the arbitration agreement,
and include a prominent disclosure clause on the effects of signing the
arbitration agreement. 249 The bill also would have amended sections 6(b)
and 15A(b) of the Arbitration Act, which address the duty of the SROs to
provide rules to ensure "fair, equitable and expeditious resolution of con-
247. H.R. 4960, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 134 CoNG. REC. 2,233-2235 (1988).
248. Id. at 2234.
249. Id.
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troversies and disputes." ' 2 0 To accomplish this goal, the bill would have
required, at a minimum, SRO rules that would make available adequate
discovery, ensure the selection of an impartial panel, provide the customer
with the arbitrators' biographical data, and mandate a written summary of
the arbitrators' award.2
It has been observed that the legislation as drafted revealed the sponsors'
one-sided approach to the issues presented therein and a collective lack of
knowledge about the arbitration process in general. 252 First, the Uniform
Code of Arbitration always has provided that a majority of the panel be
from the public sector. Second, arbitrators always have been empowered to
order discovery and depositions, and with the recent amendment of section
20 of the Code, more formal guidelines will ensure greater compliance by
the parties to such requests. Third, one of the advantages of arbitration is
that disputes can be resolved quickly, inexpensively, and with finality.
Written opinions only would encourage appeals and undermine the system.
Finally, biographical data about the arbitrators currently is being provided
pursuant to section 9 of the Code, thus making this proposal unnecessary.
A consensus could not be reached among the subcommittee members
to proceed with the bill before the SEC received reports from the SROs on
their reform activities. Thus, House Resolution 4960 died in subcommittee.
Similar legislation, however, may be reintroduced in the 101st Congress.
1. SEC Response to Proposed Legislative Reform.
On July 7, 1988, the SEC met to consider a two-part recommendation
concerning predispute arbitration agreements. One of the staff recommen-
dations proposed legislation similar to a provision in House Resolution 4960
that would prohibit broker-dealers from making the signing of a predispute
arbitration agreement by the customer a condition of doing business. An
alternate staff recommendation would direct each SRO that currently pro-
vides arbitration forums to consider using its own rulemaking authority to
achieve the same objective. Neither recommendation was acted on because
the SROs and industry representative had assured the SEC that actions
would be taken to address shortcomings in the system. During the subsequent
subcommittee's hearings on the bill, Chairman Ruder stated that legislation
is premature and that he would prefer to allow necessary changes to be
made via the flexible approach of rulemaking through the SROs with SEC
approval.
On the next day, the SEC, however, sent letters to the SROs requesting
a review of current practices with respect to predispute arbitration clauses
in options, margin, and cash accounts. 3 The SROs were directed to file
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Hoblin, SEcuRIrris ARDriRATioN: PROCEDURES, STRATEGIES, CASES 9 (Supp. 1988).
253. Letter from David S. Ruder, Chairman of SEC to all SRO's requesting study of
predispute arbitration clause (July 8, 1988).
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alternatives to the SEC's staff proposal for legislation by October 15. At
the present time, the SEC staff is reviewing these submissions.
2. Regulatory and Legislative Reform at the State Level.
With federal legislation banning mandatory arbitration of securities
disputes stalled in a House subcommittee, regulatory and legislative efforts
moved rapidly at the state level. Massachusetts became the first state to
promulgate regulations banning mandatory predispute arbitration agree-
ments. In July 1988 the Massachusetts Securities Division proposed amend-
ments to its broker-dealer regulation. The major thrust of the proposed
regulation gave the customer of a brokerage firm the choice of whether or
not to sign a predispute arbitration clause. Further, under the regulation, a
broker-dealer may not condition the opening of an account upon the signing
of an arbitration provision.
254
The North American Securities Administrators Association (NASAA)
voiced support of the proposal. An internal NASAA survey indicated that
sixteen states that give regulators the power to adopt rules barring mandatory
arbitration (and thus avoiding the legislative process) would consider similar
restrictions on mandatory arbitration during the next six months. The sixteen
states include Alaska, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa,
North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Tennessee,
Virginia, Washington and Wisconsin.2 5
Representatives of the securities industry registered their opposition to
the proposal on numerous grounds. The president of the Securities Industry
Association ("SIA"), Edward O'Brien, challenged the proposals as being
preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act, thereby leaving "no room for a
state legislative effort to subvert a private party's right to enter into binding
predispute arbitration agreements. '25 6 Another representative from the in-
dustry observed that the present system was efficient and cited the lack of
any evidence that proves that the system is in fact unsatisfactory. Industry
representatives also attacked the false impression that customers, who would
prefer to litigate their claims, are denied access to the securities markets by
254. The general requirements and purposes of this regulation were stated in the filing
prepared by the Securities Division of the Office of the Secretary of State of Massachusetts:
The regulation defines as a 'dishonest or unethical practice in the securities
business' the requirement by a broker-dealer that a Massachusetts customer sign a
mandatory predispute arbitration contract as a basis for doing business with the
broker. It also requires that the broker conspicuously notify the customer of this
requirement and requires that the legal consequences of signing such an agreement
be explained to the customer. The purpose of the regulation is to provide the
customer with a meaningful choice prior to making a decision to sign the agreement.
Regulation Filing prepared by the Office of the Secretary of State of Massachusetts, Securities
Division, at 1 (Sept. 22, 1988).
255. News Advisory of North American Securities Admin. Assoc., at I (Sept. 22, 1988)
(available from Wash. & Lee L. Rev.).
256. 20 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA), No. 30, at 11219 (July 29, 1988).
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mandatory predispute agreements. According to industry representatives, a
recent SEC survey revealed that most brokerage houses do not require cash
customers to sign the agreements. The securities industry also noted that
margin account customers who wished to avoid mandatory predispute
agreements could borrow funds from the bank rather than from a brokerage
house.
On September 22, 1988, however, Massachusetts Secretary of State,
Michael Connolly, announced in Washington, D.C. the adoption of the
regulationY 7 Representative Edward Markey (D-Mass.), who was present
when Connolly made his announcement, applauded Massachusetts' effort
to ban mandatory predispute agreements and urged other states to take
similar action. Markey said that he intended to "continue the fight to return
to investors their right to a day in court in the 101st Congress.... ,"
Industry response to the announcement of Massachusetts' new state
regulation was swift. On September 23, 1988, the SIA and ten broker-
dealers filed a complaint seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. 9 Moving
rapidly to rule on the challenge prior to the new regulation's effective date,
January 1, 1989, the court, on December 19, 1988, granted the plaintiffs'
257. MAss. REGs. CODE tit. 950, § 12.204 (1988), as amended by adding a new subsection,
12.204(a)(2)(G), reads in its entirety as follows:
G. Dishonest or unethical practices in the securities business.
1. Broker-dealers. Each broker-dealer shall observe high standards of commercial
honor and just and equitable principles of trade in the conduct of its business. Act
and practices, including but not limited to the following, are considered contrary to
such standards and constitute dishonest or unethical practices which are grounds for
denial, suspension or revocation or registration or such other action authorized by
law:
a. Requiring on or after January 1, 1989, that a customer located in Massachusetts,
other than a customer that is an institutional investor or financial institution specified
in 950 CMR 14.401(e), execute either a mandatory pre-dispute arbitration contract
or a customer agreement containing a mandatory pre-dispute arbitration clause that
is a non-negotiable precondition to effecting transactions in securities for the account
of the customer or opening a securities cash account or margin account by the
customer with such broker-dealer;
b. Requesting on or after January 1, 1989, that a customer located in Massachusetts
execute either a mandatory predispute arbitration contract or a customer account
agreement containing a pre-dispute arbitration clause where the contract or agreement
fails to conspicuously disclose that the execution of the contract or agreement cannot
be made a non-negotiable precondition to the opening by the customer of a securities
account with the broker-dealer;
c. Requesting on or after January 1, 1989, that a customer located in Massachusetts
execute either a mandatory pre-dispute arbitration contract or a customer account
agreement containing a pre-dispute arbitration clause without fully disclosing to the
customer in writing the legal effect of the pre-dispute arbitration contract or clause;
d. Being found by a court of competent jurisdiction to have violated M.G.L. c.93A
in connection with the sale of securities; and
e. Being temporarily or permanently enjoined by any court of competent jurisdiction
from violating M.G.L. c.93A in connection with the sale of securities.
258. 20 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA), No. 37, at 1436 (Sept. 23, 1988).
259. Securities Industry Assoc. v. Connolly, 703 F. Supp. 146 (D. Mass. 1988).
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motion for summary judgment and enjoined the enforcement of the regu-
lations. Agreeing with the rationale espoused by the SIA, Judge Woodlock
ruled:
... Massachusetts Blue Sky Authorities are without power to
enforce [the prospective regulations]. The ... arbitration regulations
are not merely state law supplementation concerning matters col-
lateral to the validity and enforceability of arbitration agreements.
Rather, they go to the heart of the process of forming contracts to
arbitrate. In doing so, they single out arbitration agreements for
more demanding standards than are imposed by the general law of
contracts in Massachusetts. Consequently, I ... declare the Mas-




The Commonwealth of Massachusetts appealed the decision. On August 31,
1989, the First Circuit affirmed the district court's decision and found that
the regulations were preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act. 26'
C. Industry Reform Efforts Relating to the Content and Disclosure of
Arbitration Clauses.
The SEC in its September 1987 letter did not address the content and
disclosure of predispute agreements to arbitrate in customer agreements.
SICA, however, has responded to federal and state legislative efforts ad-
dressing the use of such agreements and has developed a proposed disclosure
rule that would require the highlighting of not only the arbitration clause,
but of specific language disclosing the effects of a customer's agreement to
arbitrate disputes.
262
260. Id. at 147.
261. Securities Industry Assoc. v. Connolly, No. 89-1022 (1st Cir. Aug. 31, 1989).
262. At its September 19, 1988 meeting, the following rule was approved by SICA:
Requirements When Using Pre-dispute Arbitration Agreements with Customers
(1) Any pre-dispute arbitration clause shall be highlighted and shall be immediately
preceded by the following disclosure language which shall also be highlighted:
(a) Arbitration is final and binding on the parties.
(b) The parties are waiving their right to seek remedies in court, including
the right to jury trial.
(c) Pre-arbitration discovery is generally more limited than and different
from court proceedings.
(d) The arbitrators' award is not required to include factual findings or legal
reasoning and any party's right to appeal or to seek modification of rulings
by the arbitrators is strictly limited.
(e) The panel of arbitrators will typically include a minority of arbitrators
who were or are affiliated with the securities industry.
(2) Immediately preceding the signature line, there shall be a statement that the
agreement contains a predispute arbitration clause which statement shall be initialed
by the customer.
(3) A copy of the agreement containing any such clause shall be given to the
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CONCLUSION
In light of Rodriguez, arbitration is now the primary dispute resolution
forum in the securities industry. As a result, the arbitration rules and
procedures of SROs will come under even greater scrutiny. It is unlikely
that the 101st Congress will adopt legislation because the SROs appear to
be making many, if not all, of the changes at which House Resolution 4960
was directed. However, these changes and others that are likely to be
mandated will make arbitration a far more formal dispute resolution forum.
It also is highly probable that courts will develop additional theories on
which to base a wider scope of review of arbitration awards.
customer who shall acknowledge receipt thereof on the agreement or on a separate
document.
(4) No agreement shall include any condition which limits or contradicts the rules
of any self-regulatory organization or limits the ability of a party to file any claim
in arbitration or limits the ability of the arbitrators to make any award.
(5) The requirements of this section shall apply only to new agreements signed by
an existing or new customer of a member after. ...
Minutes of the Meeting of the Securities Industry Conference on Arbitration, at 1-3 &
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